University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

2015

We Are Against Socialized Medicine, But What Are We For?:
Federal Health Reinsurance, National Health Policy, and the
Eisenhower Presidency
Jordan M. Graham
University of Montana - Missoula

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd
Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, Political History Commons, and
the United States History Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Graham, Jordan M., "We Are Against Socialized Medicine, But What Are We For?: Federal Health
Reinsurance, National Health Policy, and the Eisenhower Presidency" (2015). Graduate Student Theses,
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 4492.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4492

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

WE ARE AGAINST SOCIALIZED MEDICINE, BUT WHAT ARE WE FOR?:
FEDERAL HEALTH REINSURANCE, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY, AND THE
EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY
BY
JORDAN MCKENZIE GRAHAM
Bachelor of Arts, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, 2012
A Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
in History
The University of Montana
Missoula, Montana
May 2015
Approved by:
Sandy Ross, Dean of the Graduate School
University of Montana
Dr. Michael S. Mayer, Chair
Department of History, University of Montana
Dr. Jeff Wiltse
Department of History, University of Montana
Dr. Robert P. Saldin
Department of Political Science, University of Montana

Graham, Jordan, M.A., Spring 2015

History

We Are Against Socialized Medicine, but What Are We For?: Federal Health Reinsurance,
National Health Policy, and the Eisenhower Presidency
Chairperson: Dr. Michael S. Mayer
This project investigates the foundations of post-war health care in the United States by
examining the first major proposal for federal involvement in health insurance, after the defeat of
national health insurance in 1949. In doing so, this project aims to also illustrate Dwight
Eisenhower’s  presidency  as  one  of  limited  liberal,  or  “Tory,”  reform.    The majority of primary
sources were located at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.
Secondary sources were chosen based on the frequency with which contemporary scholarship
continues to rely upon and engage with them.
In the first two chapters, the thesis examines the state of American health care coverage and the
dialogue of reform that surrounded it. These chapters show that a significant divide existed
between  the  quality  of  medical  care  and  it’s  availability by the 1950s. At the same time, a wide
gap divided those who supported either a federal or private solution. Chapters three and four
examine the evolution of reinsurance as a bill and its progress through the House of
Representatives. The Eisenhower administration’s  approach  to  the  issue  of  health  care  coverage  
rested in between liberal calls for increased federal operation and conservative demands to leave
the problem for private industry to solve. Eisenhower proposed reinsurance in the hope that it
would increase the number of Americans with health insurance, while fending off the
socialization of medicine. The thesis demonstrates that, instead of receiving even limited
support from both sides of the spectrum, reinsurance was opposed by each.
Despite the existence of a welfare state that relied on both public and private support, health
insurance proved an inhospitable sector for further federal involvement in the post-war era.
While the costs of health insurance prevented nearly 60 million Americans from receiving such
coverage by the early 1950s, demands for a direct federal solution were overridden by the
demands of industry and fears of increased government controls. Furthermore, reinsurance
represented an archetypal illustration of  Dwight  Eisenhower’s  “middle  way”  presidency.
Reinsurance was a measure of Tory reform, designed to increase welfare while preventing a
more radical option.
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Introduction:

On January 6, 1954, Dwight Eisenhower wrote to his brother Milton, one of his closest
confidents   and   advisers,   to   offer   his   understanding   of   the   federal   government’s   role   in   the  
“maintenance   of   prosperity.”      Such   a   role, the President contended, must vary with times in
which it exists. Given the economic uncertainties in post-war  America,  Eisenhower  stated,  “In  
these days I am sure that the government has to be the principal coordinator and, in many cases,
the actual  operator  for  the  many  things  that  the  approach  of  depression  would  demand.”    While
he did not list health care as an example within the letter, President  Eisenhower’s  belief  that  the  
government had a role to play in American welfare foreshadowed his call for a new form of
federal involvement in the field of health care.1
Eisenhower delivered his second State of the Union Address on January 7, 1954. The first
Republican president in over two decades, he had won a landslide election campaigning to end
what conservative Republican senator, Karl Mundt, called, “K1C2”  or  “Korea, Communism, and
Corruption.”   By the end of his first year, Eisenhower had already made good on some of his
pledges. The  “police  action”  in  Korea  had  ended  the  previous  July.    Furthermore, the corruption
that  had  plagued  Harry  Truman’s  presidency  had  largely  disappeared.    Despite  the  potential  for  a  
shrinking economy in post-war America, the United States had been experiencing steady growth.
After a successful first year, the former five-star General of the Army and first Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe seemed to be settling comfortably into the presidency.2

1

President Dwight Eisenhower to Dr. Milton Eisenhower, January 6, 1954, Milton S.
Eisenhower Papers-1954 (1), Box 14, Milton S. Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.
2
Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson by winning 83 percent of the Electoral College and lost
only  nine  of  the  48  states,  in  “Election  of  1952,”  The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1952.
1

The State of the Union message focused on three areas: foreign affairs, the economy, and
social welfare. In foreign affairs, the speech primarily highlighted success in Korea. It also
alluded to potential issues arising in the Middle East, a proposal for atomic energy, and the
administration’s  plan  for  national  defense  for  the  upcoming  year.    With  respect  to  the  economy,  
the president stated he would soon make a formal request for Congress both to cut taxes and
reduce the budget significantly.

He then turned to welfare.

Along with calls for the

desegregation of Washington D.C. and a reduction in the age of suffrage, the president fo his
attention to the state of health care as  major  part  of  his  administration’s  efforts  in  this  area.3
The major problem for American health care, Eisenhower asserted, was the growing
schism between available health insurance coverage and the number of Americans actually
insured. Despite the Republican president’s  stated  opposition  to  the  socialization  of  medicine, he
believed that the federal government could, and should, take a number of possible actions to
assist American families in meeting rising medical costs. He proposed the creation of a federal
reinsurance fund to support existing private health insurance plans. With this proposal, the
government would underwrite private providers against disastrous losses, thus lowering costs
and encouraging such companies to expand coverage to a larger population, especially to highrisk individuals. Two weeks later, Eisenhower presented the reinsurance plan in further detail
through a special, health-centered message to Congress.4
This proposal for reinsurance came at a unique point in the history of American health
care. As federal and employment-based welfare had grown significantly throughout the New

3

Dwight  Eisenhower,  “Annual  Message  to  the  Congress  on  the  State  of  the  Union,”  Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960) 6-22.
4
Despite 92 million people covered under private health insurance, nearly 75 percent of families
with annual incomes below $2,000 had no health coverage; see Michael S. Mayer, The
Eisenhower Years (New York: Facts on File, 2010), xvi.
2

Deal and Second World War, many Americans had begun to see health care coverage as both a
necessity and a right. By the mid-1940s, the course of the American health care system in many
ways seemed as if it was on a track towards federally sponsored, compulsory health insurance.
This trajectory peaked in 1945, when Truman endorsed a plan for national health insurance to
Congress as an integral part of realizing the Economic Bill of Rights that Franklin Roosevelt had
proposed in 1944. Many historians cite public support  for  Truman’s  plan  reaching as high as 75
percent in 1945, with only 17 percent supporting voluntary insurance as the solution for meeting
rising medical costs. However, the campaign against compulsory national health insurance (led
by the American Medical Association) turned the tide, resulting in only 21 percent support by
1949.5
This change in public opinion reflected several insights into the perception of government
interference into American health care on the part of individuals and business alike. It should
first be pointed out that a large part of the drop could easily be traced to   a   drop   in   Truman’s  
approval rating. However, historians have also greatly attributed this change in public opinion to
changing American conceptions regarding the role of the federal government in the day-to-day
lives of individuals, as well a public fear of socialism and communism taking hold in the United
States. More than any other organization, the American Medical Association established itself

5

The Wagner-Dingell-Murray  bill  of  1943  served  as  the  basis  for  Harry  Truman’s  quest  for  
national  health  insurance.    Roosevelt’s  Economic  Bill  of  Rights  included  the  “The  right  to  
adequate  protection  from  the  economic  fears  of  old  age,  sickness,  accident,  and  unemployment”  
and  “the  right  to  adequate  medical  care  and  the  opportunity  to  achieve  and  enjoy  good  health,”  in  
Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States Since 1930
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) 36; The 1945 poll that indicates 75 percent support
for the plan is found in Jill Quadagno, One Nation, Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National
Health Insurance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6. However, her source for that
data could not be located. Her use of the 1949 poll can be found in Gallup Polls, Public Opinion,
1935-71 (Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, 1973), 2:801. The 17 percent figure can be found
at Gallup Polls, Public Opinion, 1935-71 (Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, 1973), 1:578.
3

as   a   leader   in   the   shaping   of   American   understanding   of   the   federal   government’s   role   in  
medicine. The AMA proved a deciding force in 1935, when its opposition prevented any
reference to health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935. The  AMA’s most significant
activity in the field to that point came with its opposition to the Truman plan. Totaling $1.5
million,   the   AMA’s   1949   campaign   against   the   proposal   for   national   health   insurance   was   the  
most expensive lobbying campaign in American history to that point. The success of the AMA
did not necessarily demonstrate widespread support for their viewpoint. Rather, its success may
well have resulted from the fragmented nature of post-war health opinions, of which the AMA
ably took advantage.6
Whereas the AMA contributed to the growing opposition to increased involvement by the
government, both the support for national health insurance and the unease with voluntary
insurance that was seen in 1945 had not disappeared. For Democrats in Congress, the defeat of
Truman’s   plan   did   not   end   their   pursuit   of   a   health   insurance   option   that featured the federal
government as the principal coordinator and operator. By increasing federal involvement while
encouraging private expansion, the Eisenhower administration’s   federal   reinsurance   proposal  
was designed to fit between these two sides of the health policy spectrum. A plan that had the
potential to meet the needs of the two major sides of the health debate, and which also carried the
support of an enormously popular president who had a Republican majority in Congress, would
seem to have had a great chance to succeed. However, Eisenhower’s  proposal for governmentindemnified healthcare ultimately failed in fewer than two years.
Instead of seeing reinsurance as supporting private, voluntary health insurance, the AMA
and a majority of insurance companies saw the plan as an attempt to increase federal regulatory
6

Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982) 266-269, 289.
4

powers, while potentially creating an opening to socialized medicine. Proponents of federal
regulation, including most congressional Democrats and labor organizations, saw reinsurance’s  
limited scope as inadequate to effect significant change. Moreover, the Republican Party was
similarly divided. The midwestern conservative wing had continued to grow in opposition to the
eastern liberal wing that had controlled the national party for decades. Conservative Republicans
ultimately proved an enormous obstacle not just to reinsurance, but to Eisenhower’s   liberal  
Republicanism in general throughout his presidency.
By tracing the growth of health insurance coverage from the New Deal until the rise of
reinsurance,  and  through  the  plan’s  defeat  a  short  time  later,  this  project  will  demonstrate  that  the  
competing interests of private and public welfare proved an inhospitable environment for a plan
that did not directly support either. Numerous groups, which had been historically opposed to
each other, joined forces to kill a bill that had the potential to exact a measure of the change that
each desired.

In addition to the   shortsightedness   of   the   bill’s   opponents,   the   potential  

shortcomings of the bill will become evident throughout the course of the project. Both side of
the political spectrum criticized the initial $25 million dollar funding as inadequate, while
Eisenhower’s  administration  only  pursued  the plan for fewer than two years.
The reliance on private insurance options that began to take hold in the American
conscience at this time has continued to grow until today; most recently, the Affordable Care Act
of 2010. Despite numerous popular efforts for federal health options for a majority of the
population, a commitment to the tenets free enterprise have often proved overwhelming.
This  project’s  exploration  of  the  state  of  health  care  in  post-war America will also reveal
a key characteristic of Dwight Eisenhower as president. As the first Republican president
following the New Deal, his term might have been the moment to attack or attempt to dismantle

5

the dramatic increase in federal controls. However, modern historiography classifies him as a
Tory reformer, and his  presidency  is  often  termed  the  “middle  way.”    Like  the  Tory  reform  of  
nineteenth century leader Benjamin Disraeli, Eisenhower moved to cement and, in some cases,
expand liberal programs. His administration supported increases in social security benefits and
expansion of coverage, enormous public works projects, and new programs on public health and
education. Further, the administration made strides towards protecting civil rights.
While Eisenhower believed in these programs, he knew that reversing the popular New
Deal was not possible and that attempting to do so was political suicide. Without drastically
changing the New Deal, Eisenhower, in true Tory form, pursued moderate increases in order to
prevent more radical change. Reinsurance serves as a perfect example of this. Seeing the
demand for health care reform, with socialized medicine becoming an increasing possibility,
Eisenhower moved to initiate a plan that included tenets from both sides of the political, health
care spectrum. If this limited option could be reached, the more radical alternative could be
avoided while still offering a solution to the millions without health insurance.7

7

For  more  on  Eisenhower  as  a  Tory  reformer  or  his  “middle  way”  presidency,  see  Mayer,  The
Eisenhower Years viii-ix, 200-201; Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism (DeKalb, IL:
Northern Illinois University Press, 2006); David L. Stebenne, Modern Republican: Arthur
Larson and the Eisenhower Years, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006); and
Arthur Larson, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew (New  York:  Scribner’s,  1968).
6

Chapter One:
Health Reinsurance, American Health  Policy,  and  the  Battle  Over  “Socialized  Medicine”

The American health care system of the 1950s derived from the growth of state welfare
during the New Deal and the Second World War. Historians have come to comprehend the
development of health coverage by this point in American history as the product of competing
interests. They have particularly attributed varying degrees of effectiveness to the state, private
industry, and labor unions.
In "Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare
Benefits in the Private Sector," historian Beth Stevens found that the American  “private welfare
state” developed between the 1920s and the 1940s. She argued that the rise of the private
welfare state was the product of both intended and unintended consequences by the federal
government between the 1920s and 1940s. According to Stevens, early attempts by the federal
government to encourage private-sector benefits through the Revenue Act of 1926 failed. The
Act offered tax breaks for funds placed into pension plans as well as employee benefits in an
attempt to increase private welfare offerings. She found that the tax exemptions largely went
unused as corporations were more focused on maintaining employment and wage rates than with
individual security. Stevens argued that private indifference to state welfare initiatives continued
into the New Deal.8
When Americans quickly took advantage of the protections provided by the Social
Security Act of 1935, employers responded either by integrating their existing benefit plans with
8

Beth Stevens, "Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare
Benefits in the Private Sector" in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, ed. Margaret
Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 126129.
7

federal offerings or cutting provided benefits altogether. They argued that private offerings
would only duplicate the Social Security benefits. Facing labor shortages during the war,
wartime legislation encouraged an increase in private benefits as a means of increasing
employment and rewarding employees. While primarily designed to raise taxes to support war
efforts, the Revenue Act of 1942 included two provisions that stimulated private pensions. The
first required that benefit plans  cover  at  least  70  percent  of  a  company’s  employees  in  order  to  
receive tax exemptions for payment made into employee pensions. The second created an 80-90
percent tax on excess corporate profits, causing employers to invest excess profits into benefit
programs. Stevens finds that the new law resulted in an increase of employer contributions from
$171 million in 1941 to $857 million in 1945. By the end of the war, health insurance coverage
had tripled the 1941 levels. World War II proved to be one of the most influential forces in the
history American health insurance.9
Stevens found that the period immediately following the end of the war was the moment
when   “federal   influence   on   the   development   of   private-sector benefits entered its most direct
phase.”    Responding  to  pressure  from  labor  and  “autonomous  interests,”  the  federal  government  
came to place private benefits within the framework of collective bargaining. Stevens argued
that was the moment that the state moved to “rationalize  and  institutionalize”  the  private  welfare  
state.      Government   influence   that   had   begun   as   “inadvertent”   byproducts   had,   by   the   1950s,
shifted to a conscious belief that encouraging private benefits provided labor harmony and
prevented union pressure for public programs.10
Historian Sanford Jacoby examined the actions of private industry in the creation of the
growing private welfare state in his article, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Role of
9

Ibid. 130-134.
Ibid. 134,126.

10

8

Marion B. Folsom." Jacoby used Marion Folsom, one of the pre-war  era’s  leading  advocates of
welfare capitalism, to illustrate the growing corporate support for basic federal intervention as
means of limiting local welfare costs while both maintaining and boosting private fringe benefits.
In order to centralize corporate power and protect its interests during the creation of the Social
Security Act of 1935, Folsom lobbied employers to support Social Security against more radical
alternatives. He found that Social Security would act a Keynesian stabilizer,   which   “could  
coexist with – even subsidize – private  efforts.”    Jacoby  found that  Folsom’s  contributions  to  the  
creation of the Act successfully provided protections for the private sector as well as lent a
corporate structure to the pre-war welfare legislation.11
Much of the attention previously focused on Social Security before World War II shifted
to   the   “unsettled   question”   of   national   health   insurance after the war. Now chairman of the
National   Association   of   Manufactures’   social   security   committee, Folsom argued that such
coverage  should  be  “purely  private”  and  focused  his  attention  of  defeating  the  Wagner-MurrayDingell bill for national health insurance. He and the NAM sought to replace such a plan with
substantially increased private health benefits. Labor unions followed suit by similarly pushing
for increased private pension benefits. Without support from business and labor, the national
health insurance bill failed. Health benefits had become the domain of bargaining between

11

Sanford  Jacoby,  “Employers  and  the  Welfare  State:  The  Role  of  Marion  B.  Folsom,”  The
Journal of American History 80, 2 (Sep. 1993): 525-556, 525-526. Jacoby defined welfare
capitalism,  as  “A  movement  whose  main  idea  was  that  corporations,  rather  than  trade  unions  or  
government,  should  form  the  central  structure  in  a  society’s  welfare  system.”    Marion  Folsom’s  
testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in 1935 requested the inclusion of several final
protections and incentives for the private sector, most of which were included in the final Social
Security legislation. See 540.
9

business   and   labor.      Folsom   later   recalled,   that   by   1953,   “you   didn’t   find   any   business   people  
against  social  security.”12
Following the atrocities of World War II, international organizations began to include
health as a key component of social justice. The World Health Organization’s constitution of
1946  stated,  “the  enjoyment  of  the  highest  attainable  standard  of  health  is  one  of  the  fundamental
rights   of   every   human   being.”      The United Nations declared the right to medical care in its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Furthermore, many developed nations began to
offer   “cradle-to-grave”   welfare  in   the  form   of  pensions,  unemployment insurance, and medical
coverage. Beatrix Hoffman argued in Health Care for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United
States Since 1930, that  the  American  belief  in  the  “individuals’  right  to  be  free  from  government  
interference and to choose freely in the   marketplace”   precluded   such   comprehensive   welfare  
action in the United States. For her, this fit into the classic American belief that often saw
individual rights as impeding or contradicting social rights. She maintained that  this  “notion  of  
rights”  played,  and  continues  to  play,  a  crucial  role  within  the  evolution  of  the  American  health  
care system.13
When the Great Depression left millions of Americans unable to pay the costs of medical
care, the federal government began providing numerous forms of emergency relief to private
hospitals and other health care facilities. By 1935, Hoffman noted that financial support for
voluntary hospitals from the government surpassed private funding. Federal support for health

12

Ibid. 550-551.
Article  25  of  the  “Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,”  December  10,  1948,  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr; “Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization,”  July  
22, 1946, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hist/official_records/constitution.pdf; Hoffman xix-xx.
Hoffman’s  book  demonstrates  the  impact  of  private  industry  beyond  its  more  tangible  actions.    
She argued that American beliefs in individual choice within the construct of a free market ideal
deeply affected popular support against increased state interventions.
13

10

care continued into wartime, when President Roosevelt proposed his Economic Bill of Rights in
January of 1944.

The bill included two portions that specifically addressed government

protected rights to health care. While the plan marked one of the heights of proposed national
health care before 1950, the failure of his plan to reach the status of law or policy demonstrated
part of the dramatic shift away from health care as  a  “right” in the post-war era.14
By  the  1950s,  Harry  Truman’s  plan  for  national  health  insurance  had  failed.    The  United
States was   not   following   the   movements   of   many   international   “cradle-to-grave”   models   of  
health care provision.

Within   Congress   and   the   overall   health   care   system,   “ideas   about  

universal rights were pushed back in favor of the ideology and practices of US-style  rationing.”    
Hoffman found that, while the quality of health care in the United States grew exponentially in
subsequent years, the benefits of such health care were not provided to all. Health care would
not be  provided  as  a  “right,”  but  as  economic options for those who had the ability.15
In   his   article,   “Health   Security   for   All?      Social   Unionism   and   Universal   Health  
Insurance,”  Alan  Derickson focused on the role of labor in the development of health insurance
by focusing on the actions of the American Federation of Labor, which represented the
“progressive”   force   within   conservative   unionism. Before the 1930s, Derickson found that
American labor generally opposed legislative proposals for health security, as demonstrated by
the first president of the AFL, Samuel Gompers. Gompers publicly opposed compulsory health
insurance and argued that workers should help themselves by paying the union dues that paid for
their benefits. This changed sharply in the 1930s, when the United States was plunged into
depression that caused a large percentage of the workforce to lose their jobs. As millions of
14
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workers no longer had access to work-based health coverage, labor interests began to pursue
compulsory health insurance.

Labor leaders concluded that the 1935 Social Security Act

“completely   ignore[d]”   dependency   caused   by   illness,   which had become a primary issue for
labor.      The   AFL   responded   by   fully   endorsing   the   creation   of   “socially   constructive   health  
insurance legislation through Congress and the individual states.”16
The labor-led support for health reform transformed into support for the 1943 WagnerMurray-Dingell bill, which sought to provide health security to all Americans by creating
federally funded and compulsory national health insurance.

The momentum peaked in 1945,

when  Truman  endorsed  the  plan  to  Congress  as  an  integral  part  of  Roosevelt’s  Economic  Bill  of  
Rights and numerous national organizations joined the coalition. Derickson argued that  labor’s  
attempt to incorporate a comprehensive array of interests into the coalition proved to be the
“crucial  flaw”  within  the  campaign  by  permanently  altering  its  public  perception.    While  national
health care had been originally seen as a move to increase the security of Americans, it was now
viewed  as  a  ground  for  “interest  group  maneuvering.”    Derickson  determined that  labor’s  failure  
to identify and fix this issue contributed to   the   failure   of   Truman’s   plan   for   national   health  
insurance.17
Following the failure of organized labor to effectuate dramatic reform in federal health
policy by 1950, Derickson argued that  labor  changed  its  stance  on  health  benefits.    It  “retreated”  
away from advocating universal coverage and shifted toward proposals that worked within
16
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existing structures of employment-based coverage. This shift was the death knell for labor’s
support for compulsory health care. As a consequence, “health  security  for  some  thus  precluded  
the  possibility  of  health  security  for  all.”18
In One Nation, Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance, historian Jill
Quadagno argued that the actions of   “the   interest   groups,   stupid” provided the definitive
explanation for a lack of American national health insurance. Her examination on the first half
of the twentieth century covered the   rise   of   the   Progressive   Era’s   campaign   for   compulsory  
health insurance, the dramatic increase of social welfare during the New Deal, and the postwar
return to private welfare. Throughout this history, Quadagno illustrated the upward trend of
interest groups.19
Despite the significant support for compulsory health insurance that existed before the
Second World War, she found that interest groups systemically defeated each one of the options.
In 1917, the American Association for Labor Legislation backed a bill in seventeen states that
would offer workers free medical services, hospital care, sick pay, and a death benefit that was
initially  passed  in  the  state  of  New  York.    Fearing  this  as  the  “wedge”  that  might  lead  to  the  end  
of the insurance industry, various New York insurance companies joined the American
Federation of Labor in an effort to repeal the bill.

When it was killed in congressional

committee, she finds that push for compulsory health insurance in the Progressive Era had died
with it.20
The New Deal saw a parallel potential for compulsory health care and a comparable
defeat at the hands of interest groups. As the Roosevelt administration worked to create the
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largest federal economic aid package in American history, it considered including national health
insurance. Quadagno maintained that when the American Medical Association heard of this in
1934, they adopted a resolution arguing that medical services should be under the domain of the
medical profession.

They   then   “bombarded”   Congress   with   various   messages   condemning  

compulsory health insurance. Fearing the potential failure of the entire Social Security Act,
Roosevelt chose,  “at  the  last  minute,” to cut out the provision for national health care. While this
case demonstrated the  strength  of  the  AMA  and  the  rest  of  the  medical  lobby,  Harry  Truman’s  
struggle for national health insurance signaled its   “arrival”   as   force   in   American   politics.      In  
order  to  kill  Truman’s  proposal, the AMA successfully used American fear of socialism and the
public trust of physicians to reduce public support for the plan drastically. Quadagno argued
that, as physicians became deeply involved in the political fight against national insurance, they
lost much of their status as professionals and became one of the increasingly powerful interest
groups.21
Political scientists Sven Steinmo and John Watts argued that the United States does not
have   comprehensive   national   health   insurance,   “because American political institutions are
biased against this type of reform.”      Their   article,   “It's   the   Institutions,   Stupid! Why
Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America,” found that a series of
political reforms, from the Progressive era until the mid-1970s, further divided the inherently
“fragmented”   American   political   system.      They   argued   this   structure   granted   large   amounts   of
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power to unyielding interest groups, thus making national health insurance impossible to
achieve.22
Literature dealing with   Eisenhower’s   plan   for   health   reinsurance   directly has been
limited. Existing works have placed the story of reinsurance as a benchmark in the long line of
failed attempts to achieve federally based health care in various forms. For Jacob Hacker, author
of The Divided Welfare State,  reinsurance  demonstrated  Eisenhower’s  belief  in  “preserving  and  
strengthening   existing   social   policy.”      Yet,   Hacker   also   argued   that   the   reinsurance proposal
offered too little financial support for insurance companies to allow federal regulation in their
industry. Without  their  support,  “the  bill  was  crushed.”    James  Sundquist used reinsurance as an
example   of   Eisenhower’s   “middle   of   the   road”   approach to politics. Sundquist found that the
president apparently  “felt  pretty  good”  when  he  was  criticized from both sides of an issue. He
quoted Eisenhower as stating, “it  makes  me  more  certain  I’m  on  the  right  track.” In The Heart of
Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office, David Blumenthal and James Morone found that
reinsurance  typified  Eisenhower’s  middle  way  approach  to  reform.    They  contended  that  the  plan  
was  meant  to  offer  better  health  care  for  all,  while  also  blunting  “Democratic  efforts to win more
ambitious  and  expensive  programs.”    They  concluded  that  despite  the  plan’s  merits,  reinsurance  
received little support from interests that pursued both an increase and decrease in federal
regulation. Jill Quadagno concluded that the failure of the plan indicated the rise of the selfserving interests of the medical profession, especially that of the American Medical Association.
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After this failure, she contended that private health insurance rapidly expanded and became the
sole enterprise of large corporations.23
When Eisenhower took the oath of office, American health care was already in a state of
turmoil. From 1945 until the end of his presidency, Truman had pursued nationally subsidized
health care through his support for the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill. The bill for national health
care, which had failed to gain the support of President Roosevelt, now faced an unprecedented
level of opposition from the AMA. Indeed, the AMA so feared the possible success of the bill,
that it opened its first lobbying office in Washington D.C.24
On September 6, 1945, Truman proposed a package for post-war reconstruction that
included an expanded form of Social Security, an increase in the federal minimum wage, a
program of full employment, a broad housing program, and a national health care plan. Two
months later, the president went back to Congress in order to propose his plan for national
healthcare; it was introduced through the reincarnated Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill. The bill,
which attempted to add national health care to Social Security, failed the next year in a
Republican Congress.25
Following his only election as president, Truman renewed his support for federally
operated health care. He returned to Congress in 1949 and asked for the adoption of the plan,
arguing that the private health care system was leaving millions of Americans without coverage.
If the United States were to adopt national health   coverage,   he   argued,   it   would   “mean that
23
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proper medical care will be economically accessible to everyone covered by it, in the country as
well  as  in  the  city,  as  a  right  and  not  as  a  medical  dole.”    Despite  this  impassioned  call, Truman
abruptly stopped publicly pursuing the cause. The numerous other divisive issues that faced the
president, such as accusations of Communist infiltration into his own administration and the
Korean War, led Truman to withdraw from his leadership in the fight over health insurance.
That role fell on the shoulders of the newly created Committee  for  the  Nation’s  Health. 26
This new organization, which had been founded in 1946, included former First Lady
Eleanor Roosevelt; president of the American Federation of Labor, William Green; businessman
and former president of General Electric, Gerard Swope; and two-time president of the
Massachusetts State Medical Society, Channing Frothingham.

Although it contained the

expertise   and   representation   of   many   leaders   of   business,   labor,   and   medicine,   the   proposal’s  
opponents proved far more effective in mobilizing popular resistance.
The primary opponent was the American Medical Association. It collected $25 from
each of its members, creating a war chest that paid for opposition measures such as hiring the
public relations firm Whitaker and Baxter to create a national campaign against health care
reform. This campaign included the use of a well-known painting of doctor at the bedside of
sick   child   with   the   words   “Keep   Politics   Out   of   This   Picture,” which was sent to 65,000
physicians to be placed in their waiting rooms.27
Beatrix Hoffman contended that opponents primarily feared the potential harm that
increased government control might have on the economy, especially the personal economy of
physicians and the medical industry as a whole. Furthermore, challengers to the bill argued that
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the proposal would threaten the autonomy of medical professionals, thus eroding the quality of
American medical care. The most significant of all the arguments contended that the very
essence of the plan was contradictory to democracy, tagging it “Soviet-style socialized
medicine.” Despite the popular support for the majority of New Deal programs, which had
already increased the size of the federal government dramatically, the arguments against federal
control of health care proved successful. Public support dropped to 21 percent in 1949. The
proposal would never see the public support it had in 1945.28
Despite  the  defeat  of  Truman’s  proposal  for  national  health  care,  the  issues  of  American  
medicine were far from settled. The large segment of Americans who had wanted a significant
extension of health care coverage in the mid-1940 had become dissatisfied with the progress of
Truman’s  plan.    Nonetheless, many continued to support a federal solution. At the same time,
Eisenhower understood that the majority of Americans, especially those lacking medical
insurance, would not settle for the existing system.29

In July of 1917, chairman of the Preventive Medicine Section of the AMA, Dr. Otto P.
Grier, wrote a piece for The New York Times calling for an increased  role  for  “Federal,  State,  and  
municipal health works.”      Dr.   Grier   believed   that   “this type of socialized medicine
will…discover  disease  in  its  incipiency;;  it  will  prevent  loss  from  illness.”    He  also   argued  that  
the socialization of medicine would mean,   “the   raising   of   the   standards   of   medical   practice.”  
While opponents of federal involvement came to use the term “socialized   medicine” in a
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derogatory manner in the 1930s, this clearly had not always been the case. In the period after
World War II, the term mostly referred to compulsory systems of universal health care to be
operated and regulated through the federal government. Not all who used the term understood it
in  exactly  this  way.    The  phrase  “socialized  medicine”  in  the  1930s,  and  after,  was  increasingly  
tied into American anticommunism. As early as the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921, historian
Colin Gordon found that the AMA began  to  use  the  term  “as  a  lightning  rod  for  New  Era  redbaiting.”    By  1948,  Gordon  contended that  “medical  McCarthyism  really  picked  up  steam  after  
1948”   as   the   Wagner-Murray-Dingell   bill   progressed   through   Congress   and   “anticommunist  
posturing increasingly  dominated  partisan  politics.”    Reinsurance  rarely  received  designation  as  
“socialized  medicine”  from  the  AMA  or  their  fellow  opponents.    Instead,  they  argued  it  would  
have opened the door to the socialization of medicine.30
The   concept   of   “professionalism”   also   played a significant role in the story of
reinsurance.    According  to  sociologist  Magali  Larson,  the  “professional  phenomenon”  developed  
as groups, such as medicine, formed professional associations and created their own training,
forms of self-governance, and codes of ethics.

As this continued, public perceptions of

physicians  as  a  public  good  combined  with  medicine’s  esoteric  knowledge  to  elevate  doctors  to  
an elevated status. The AMA was able to use its status as a profession to shape public opinion in
a manner that none of the other opponents of reinsurance could. The public trusted doctors with
their health and it looked at the medical profession as an expert in the field of health coverage.
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Thus, the AMA and the profession that it represented proved to be a particularly effective
opponent  of  both  national  health  insurance  and  Eisenhower’s  reinsurance  plan.31
Using current scholarship as a barometer, the struggle over federal health reinsurance
seems to be relatively minor in comparison to that of the Truman plan or even future proposals
such as Medicare and the Affordable Care Act. Nonetheless, this particular time in the history of
American medicine provides an opportunity to understand its modern foundations and the
evolving function of the federal government. As the health needs of Americans came up against
the economic drive of private industry, the social role of public and private welfare were
continually reconceptualized. Furthermore, the proposal for reinsurance demonstrated Dwight
Eisenhower’s “middle  way”  presidency  and  his  approach  to  reform.  
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Chapter Two:
Post-War  Health  Policy  and  the  “Fratricidal  Twin  Brothers”

In his analysis of the Republican Party at the presidential election of 1952, historian
Steven  Wagner  characterized  the  divided  GOP  as  the  “fratricidal  twin  brothers.”    The  popularity  
of President Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal worked to split Republicans. Accepting the
more expansive role of the federal government as a popular edict, the more powerful, liberal
wing of the Republican Party put forth presidential nominees who likewise supported the
continuation of New Deal programs, including Alf Landon in 1936 and Thomas Dewey in 1944
and   1948.      For   conservative   Republicans,   Dewey’s   defeat   in   1948   further   proved   that   their  
counterparts had betrayed the historical tenets of the Grand Old Party and that doing so did not
lead to a victory. In addition, liberal  Republicans  supported  Truman’s  policy  of  containment  and  
his Europe-centered approach to foreign policy. The opposing notions with respect federal
responsibility  and  foreign  policy  represented  the  “fratricidal  twin  brothers.” 32
After another Democratic victory in 1948, conservatives responded by placing their full
weight behind the dominant conservative leader, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, for president in
1952. Looking to defeat Taft, liberal Republicans enlisted a popular war hero, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, to run for the nomination. The subsequent struggle between Eisenhower and Taft
further divided the party both philosophically and geographically.

The mid-Atlantic states

became the center for liberal Republicans, while the midwestern states formed the base for
32
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conservatives.

While the eastern and midwestern powers proved to be largely equal,

Eisenhower’s   popularity   proved   the   force   needed   to   tip   the   party   towards   another   liberal  
nominee.33
While   Dwight   Eisenhower’s   popularity led the way to his comfortable election as
president,   his   party’s   factionalism   presented   significant   barriers   for   Eisenhower’s   legislative  
agenda. The party schism that had greatly increased from 1948 until 1952 did not disappear
when Eisenhower was elected.

Eisenhower’s   coattails   and   the   success   of   conservatives in

congressional elections led the way for a Republican majority in the House of Representatives
and the Senate. At the same, while liberal Republicans controlled the national party, strong
Democratic opposition in the mid-Atlantic states (where liberal Republicans were strong)
combined with weak Democratic opposition in the Midwest (where Republicans were most able
to win elections), led conservatives to control the majority of Republican seats in Congress.
Despite  the  party’s  control  of  Congress  and  the  White  House,  its  division  often  aided  Democratic  
opposition   to   Eisenhower’s   legislative   proposals.      This struggle was especially visible in the
pursuit of health care reform that had intensified over Harry Truman’s  push for national health
insurance.

While most Democrats continued to push for compulsory heath insurance,

conservatives wanted to limit federal power in the field of health care. Liberal Republicans
largely sat in the middle.
This chapter will examine the state of the Republican Party in the years leading up to
Eisenhower’s  election,  as  well  as  his  first  year  as  president.    National  health  policy  proved  to  be  
a major issue in the 1952 election. Eisenhower continued the traditions of the eastern wing of his
party by campaigning on a platform of reform while simultaneously speaking out against the
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potential pitfalls of socialized medicine. A personification of liberal Republicanism, Eisenhower
fashioned  his  campaign  and  subsequent  presidency  as  a  “middle  way”  between  the  right  and  left  
political extremes. His military career provided the tremendous popular support that would
propel him into the White House, yet his middle-of-the-road approach often received little
support from conservative Republicans and Democrats in Congress.
Eisenhower’s  eventual  proposal  for  federal  reinsurance of voluntary private and nonprofit
health insurance embodied his “middle  way”  legislation, while continued opposition from both
Democrats and conservative Republicans typified the difficulty of passing such a plan in postwar America. When viewed on a grander scale, reinsurance entered into the long-standing
debate concerning the role of the federal government in the lives of its citizenry. Whereas
conservatives wanted less interference and liberals wanted more regulation, reinsurance offered a
middle ground. Rather than compromise, however, each side of the spectrum held firmly to its
ideological position.

The successor to a line of liberal Republican leaders, Thomas Dewey had come to
exemplify  liberal  Republicanism  in  the  1940s.    Dewey’s  internationalist  foreign  policy  and  belief  
in social reform had made him a favorite of the American middle-class professionals who had
become   disillusioned   with   the   Democratic   Party’s   racist   southern   fringe   and   its anti-business
components. This professional middle-class formed the basis of Republican liberalism. They
supported an American presence in post-war international organizations and the continuance of
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many New Deal programs. Repeated defeats at the hands of Democrats, however, undermined
support for the liberal wing and increased support for a conservative nominee.34
When Republicans reclaimed Congress in 1947, conservative Republicans assumed
positions of power. Robert Taft (R, OH) became chairman of the Senate Republican Policy
Committee and Joseph Martin (R, MA) became Speaker of the House. The newly conservative
Congress began to combat New Deal-style legislation supported by liberal Republicans,
Democrats, and president Truman. This infighting continued into the Republican National
Convention of 1948. While Dewey won the Republican nomination, the party had become
deeply divided. Moreover, the conflict between the 80th Congress and Truman led many to view
the GOP has both inflexible and reactionary. Harry Truman used this perception to claim
another victory for Democrats in 1948.35
While  Truman’s  push  for  national  health  insurance  had  been  dead  for  over  a  year, health
care reform remained a major point of contention within American politics. The June 1950 issue
of Cosmopolitan Magazine included an article written by Eleanor  Roosevelt,  entitled  “If  I  Were  
a  Republican  Today.”    The  former  First   Lady  chided  the Republican Party for not acting as an
opposition to Democrats. She argued that limited Republican support for internationalist foreign
policy and increased welfare spending were making the parties too similar. Roosevelt believed
that   it   had   become   “difficult to form a clear-cut idea of what the two political parties actually
represent.”         When   she   viewed   the   Republican   platform,   Roosevelt   found   “that it had some
curiously reminiscent planks that might almost have made their first appearance in the New
Deal.”      She   complained   that   Republicans   had   chosen   to   support   New   Deal   programs   and  
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opposed Democrats by stating that they could run these programs more efficiently. Eleanor
Roosevelt was undoubtedly targeting the liberal wing of the Republican Party.
“If I were a Republican today I think I would ask my Party to take a clear-cut stand. At
present it is not clear-cut.”      The   first   “clear-cut”   stand   Roosevelt   suggested   they   make   was   a  
position  on  Truman’s  national   health  insurance  bill.     She  argued  that  Republicans opposed the
legislation  as  “socialized  medicine,”  yet  they  acknowledged  the  need  for  more  medical  services;;  
“…and so they are vaguely for better medical care without specifying exactly how it is to be
accomplished.”36
The Republican Party responded in August  of  1950.    In  more  than  thirty  pages,  “A  PointBy-Point  Reply  to  Eleanor  Roosevelt’s  ‘If  I  Were  Republican  Today,”  addressed  each  comment  
from the Cosmopolitan editorial.

With regard to their   “unclear”   stance   on   medical   care,  

Republicans   asked,   “Now,   what   is   so   confusing   about   a   Republican   statement   that   specifically  
announces   (as  in  the  1948  Platform)  that  Republicans  stand  for  ‘strengthening  of  Federal-State
programs…where   the   need   is   clearly   demonstrated?’”      They   further   quoted   the   platform   by  
asserting   that   federal   aid   “must   avoid   socialization   of   the   medical   profession   or   of   any   other  
activity.”      
In  response  to  Roosevelt’s  statement  that  Republicans  were  “vaguely  for  better  medical
care,”  the  document  listed  bills such as the Hill-Burton  “Hospital  Survey  and  Construction  Act”  
and the establishment of health  organizations  such  as  the  U.S.  Public  Health  Service’s  National  
Heart Institute. Regardless of the Republican stance on health care reform, it was clear that it
was an issue with which the party was acutely concerned. Over the next few years, the GOP
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continued to refine its stance on health care as a major part of its effort to elect the first
Republican president since Herbert Hoover left office in 1933.37
By 1952, the quality of medical care and the measures needed to improve it became the
primary health concern of the Republican Party. While their updated platform in 1952 stated,
“medical  care  cannot  be  maintained  if  subject  to  federal  bureaucratic  dictation,”  it  also   asserted
that the government should have a role in the  health  of  the  American  people;;  “There should be a
just division of responsibility between government, the physician, the voluntary hospital, and
voluntary  health  insurance.”    Making  its  obligatory  stand  against  the  “bureaucratic  dead  weight”  
of socialized medicine, the 1952 platform defined it as exceedingly expensive, inefficient, and
devoid of quality medical standards. The party recognized the need for reform and stated that if
the federal government was to have a role in such a change, it must be as stimulator of existing
voluntary   systems   “without   federal   interference   in   the   local   administration.”      These   terms fell
directly  in  line  with  Eisenhower’s  own  beliefs.38
On  June  5,  1952,  Eisenhower’s  presidential  campaign  came  to  the  general’s  hometown  of  
Abilene, Kansas. After delivering a speech on the aims of his potential presidency, Eisenhower
opened up to questions   from   the   press.     When   he   was   asked   if   he   was   “for   compulsory   health  
insurance,”  Eisenhower  answered  that  in  his  time  away  from  the  military  “no  one  spoke  out  more  
then   I   did   against   the   centralization   of   power   in   Washington,”   including   the   socialization of
medicine. The presidential hopeful reasoned that such a submission to a central authority would
lead  to  socialism,  “beyond  pure  socialism  I  believe  lies  pure  dictatorship,  and  you  don’t  escape  
37
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it.”    This  belief  did  not  inhibit  Eisenhower’s  conviction that decent medical care was a right that
should be afforded to all Americans. Eisenhower stated that in his time as president of Columbia
University,  he  had  witnessed  the  “embarrassing”  costs  of  medical  education.    As  many  medical  
schools had become desperate for funding, they had turned to the government for support. In an
attempt to curb the trend towards federal medical regulation, Eisenhower had organized private
funding  for  the  school.  “If  we  didn’t,  I  believe  that  it  [would  have  been] the first step towards the
socialization  of  medicine  and  I  am  against  socialization!    That  is  my  answer.”     Throughout the
primaries, Eisenhower reaffirmed Republican calls for health reform through existing private and
voluntary systems, while opposing national health care.39
The  Republican  National  Convention  in  July  of  1952  became  a  window  into  the  party’s  
intense   division.      The   convention   began   with   Taft’s   supporters   charging   Dewey   and   party  
liberals with failing to secure a Republican president in twenty years.

Conservatives

characterized   them   as   “the   same   old   gang   of   eastern   internationalists   and   New   Dealers   who  
ganged  up  to  sell  the  Republican  Party  down  the  river  in  1940,  in  1944,  and  in  1948.”    The  early  
support  for  Taft  faded  as  refrains  of  “Taft  can’t   win”  grew louder. On the first ballot, Dwight
Eisenhower won the nomination, causing the opposition to swear revenge against   the   “Eastern  
kingmakers.” With the Republican nomination in hand, Dwight Eisenhower began his campaign
against Democratic nominee and Governor of Illinois, Adlai Stevenson.40
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As   the   November   election   neared,   Eisenhower’s   campaign   became   acutely   concerned  
with the problem of health care, especially opposing the inequities of potential socialized
medicine.    Having  seen  such  practices  in  “many  nations  of  the  old  world,”  Eisenhower  refused  to  
recommend   “such   a   disaster”   or   any   step   in   that   direction.

He condemned the Truman

administration   for   attempting   to   subsidize   medical   education,   “because   what   the   government  
subsidized it must eventually control.”      The   general   continued   by   voicing   his   appreciation for
American doctors and the advances of  American  medicine.    He  lionized  the  “relationship  of  trust  
and   confidence”   that   existed   between   doctor   and   patient.      Eisenhower   contended   that   if   a  
bureaucratic system of medical care were created in the field of American medicine, medical
advancements and doctor-patient  relationship  would  deteriorate.    “To  tamper  with  the  foundation  
of  all  the  healing  arts,”  he  maintained,  “is  to  run  a  catastrophic  risk.”  Eisenhower promised that,
if  elected,  the  solution  would  not  be  compulsory.    Rather,  it  would  rely  on  “the  immense  forces  
of  voluntary  health  insurance  and  all  other  state  and  local  agencies.”    The  answer,  he  believed,  
would come from the private sector if it  were  allowed  to  remain  “unlegislated  and  unfettered  by  
any  federal  government  control.”41
In October of 1952, the Research Division of the Republican National Committee
released   “Republicans,   Social   Security,   and   Health.”   The   piece   sought   to   paint   the   Republican
Party as a long-time   supporter   of   social   security.      In   1935,   the   document   stated,   “Republicans  
voted  overwhelmingly  for  the  original  Federal  Social  Security  Act.”    This  support  continued  for  
each amendment to the Act, as the party contended that such measures offered the best
opportunity  to  “meet  the  need  of  all  Americans  and  at  the  same  time  further  a  sound  economy.”    
The publication used Eisenhower’s statements as evidence of Republican plans to extend the
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social security program. For example, on October   9,   Eisenhower   said,   “the   millions   of   our  
people  who  ought  to  be  covered  by  it  and  are  not  will  be  covered.”
Again quoting Eisenhower, the statement on social security turned to the issue of
compulsory health insurance: “Federal   compulsion,   with   our health supervised under a
Washington stethoscope, is not American and it is not the answer. Instead of more and better
medical   care,   it   would   give   us   poorer   medical   care.”      Representing   the   Republican   platform,  
Eisenhower called for the reinforcement of existing voluntary health programs that had
demonstrated tremendous growth in the last decade. Nonetheless, Eisenhower Republicans
found that such private systems alone were not enough to cover issues such as catastrophic
illness.    “For  the  purposes  like this”  Eisenhower  said,  “the  usefulness  of  Federal  loans  or  other  
aid  to  local  health  plans  should  be  explored.”42
The broader Republican health plank in 1952 included  Eisenhower’s   appeal   for  limited  
federal involvement.

The GOP stated that it would support   plans   that   placed   “individual  

responsibility”   at   the   forefront   of   health   care   reform,   which   it   believed   the Truman plan had
lacked. The party also objected to the quality of benefits and the costs that would be associated
with compulsory health insurance. The Republican statement argued that existing voluntary
plans provided extensive hospital coverage, while the Truman plan would only provide a
maximum  of  60  days  of  the  “least  expensive  multiple-bed  accommodations  available.”    In  terms
of cost, Republicans claimed that by paying for the costs of health coverage through federal
taxes,  all  Americans  would  pay  into  the  scheme,  “whether  entitled  to  a  benefit  or  not.”    On  the  
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other side, they saw private plans as flexible enough to tailor their costs and care to the services
available in a given area, and only those who received benefits would pay into the system.43
The health plank closed  by  quoting  Dwight  Eisenhower’s  “middle  way”  approach  to  the  
issue: “legislation  which  compels  you  to  join  in  a  Federal  health  insurance  plan  is  wrong.”     At
the same time, Eisenhower   argued   that   it   was   “morally   and   ethically   wrong”   to   not   address  
individual inability to pay  for  “adequate”  health  care  and  that  “Federal aid to local health plans
that  helps  make  medical  care  available  to  those  who  need  it  is  right.”    The  platform  contended  
that experimentation in the health field was needed before a solution could be found. It also
noted that two types of solutions had begun to  be  introduced  within  this  “middle  way.”    The  first  
left the majority of control to the state and local levels and not to a federal administrator. The
second   called   for   direct   federal   action,   including   “reinsurance   by   the   federal   government   of  
voluntary health   insurance   policies,”   as   well   “indirect   subsidies”   for   those   purchasing   health  
insurance through deduction of cost from federal income tax. The Republican message closed
by stating that no sufficient solution would be possible until a Republican administration took
office   and   brought   with   it   “the   firm   knowledge   that   the   nation   will   not   have   to   submit   to  
compulsory  health  insurance.”44
While the infighting between the liberal and conservative wings of the Republican Party
reached a fevered pitch at the   party’s   convention,   the   presidential   election   was   far   more   onesided. Dwight Eisenhower won in a landslide, becoming the first Republican president in twenty
years. In addition, Republicans  gained  control  of  the  House  and  Senate.    Eisenhower’s  immense  
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popularity had all but guaranteed that he would be elected, but it also covered up the deep
factionalism within his party. While newly elected conservative Republicans in Congress were
keen on overturning liberal domestic policies, Eisenhower refused to follow suit. The new
president recognized that Americans saw the welfare state as essential and that removing it
would be a radical act. In a letter to his conservative older  brother  Edgar,  he  warned  “should any
political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you
would   not   hear   of   that   party   again   in   our   political   history.”      Dwight   recognized   that   a   “tiny  
splinter  group”  believed  this  was  possible,  but  “their  number  is  negligible  and  they  are  stupid.”    
While Dwight Eisenhower clearly saw the political pitfalls associated with removing social
welfare programs, his choice to support them also came from his personal belief that the federal
government had a responsibility to offer such social supports.45
As he launched his administration, Eisenhower continued his support for the
continuation, and often the growth of New Deal programs. He especially pursued increased
federal   spending   for   programs   that   would   act   as   “catalyst”   for   change,   while   also   preventing  
greatly increased responsibilities for the federal government. He later described this approach as
“a   liberal   program   in   all   of   those   things   that   bring   the   federal   government   in   contact   with   the  
individual,”   but   he   would   act   conservatively   when   it   came   to the nation’s   economy.      While  
midwestern Republicans derided what they saw as continuation of Democratic policy,
Eisenhower cautioned the nation against the perils of swaying too far to the right or left in
politics.    The  left,  he  contended,  saw  people  as  “so  weak, so irresponsible, that an all-powerful
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government  must  direct  and  protect  them.”    That  would  essentially  lead  to  a  “dictatorship.”    The  
right,  however,  denied  “the  obligation  of  government  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  people  even  
when the complexities of  modern  life  demand  it.”46
The   president’s   middle-of-the-road approach continued into the coordination of the
budget. When Eisenhower took office, he instructed his first budget director that in areas such as
social  security,  “I  should  like  to  put  ourselves clearly on the record as being forward-looking and
concerned  with  the  welfare  of  all  of  our  people.”    Even  when  issues  of  social  welfare  came  up  
against military spending, Eisenhower told the American Society of Newspaper Editors that
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in a final sense, a
theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”    
Eisenhower saw fiscal conservatism as a means to provide federal investment in public
programs.47
Despite the loss of the nomination to Eisenhower, Senate majority leader, Robert Taft,
worked   closely   with   the   new   president.      Eisenhower’s   relationship   with   Taft   allowed   a   short  
window of cooperation between eastern and midwestern Republicans. When Senator Taft died
suddenly of cancer in July of 1953, Eisenhower lost the man who had kept conservatives in line
with the administration. With a lack of Republican cohesion, the president often had to rely on
congressional Democrats for support. Even though he won re-election overwhelmingly in 1956,
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which Eisenhower saw as proof that America approved of moderate Republicanism, Republicans
lost every congressional election after 1952 until they won back control of the Senate in 1980.
Eisenhower often found it easier to work with Democrats than with his own party in attempting
to pass legislation.48
In his first year in office, Dwight Eisenhower proposed the creation of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to replace the Federal Security Agency. Harry Truman had
made the same proposal, however the American Medical Association and conservative
Republicans, who saw it as another vehicle for national health insurance, defeated the plan. With
a Republican president and Congress, the reincarnated plan received little opposition. The
department was created in March of 1953. When Oveta Culp Hobby was sworn in as secretary
in April, she became only the second women to hold a cabinet position.49
A  decorated  Army  colonel,  Hobby  had  commanded  the  Women’s  Army  Corps  from  the  
beginning until the end of World War II. She was married to former Democratic Governor of
Texas and publisher of the Houston Post, William P. Hobby. Oveta Culp Hobby returned to
Texas  after  the  war  to  manage  her  family’s  newspaper,  radio,  and  television  companies.    Despite  
her  position  as  a  leader  in  Texas  economic  and  Democratic  circles,  Hobby  became  a  “Democrat  
for  Eisenhower.”    Hobby  saw  Dwight  Eisenhower  as  “an electable Republican alternative”  to  the  
48

The administration’s reliance on Democrats was seen early on with the defeat of the Bricker
Amendment, which conservative Republicans heavily supported. Proposed by Senator John
Bricker, the amendment called for Senate approval for all international agreements. As
amendments to the Constitution require a two-thirds majority, the Bricker Amendment needed
61 of the 91 senators present to succeed. It was eventually defeated by a single vote. The
deciding vote could have from any of the 13 senators who had initially co-sponsored the
proposal, only to remove support at the urging of Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson.
Thirty-two Republicans voted for the revised Bricker Amendment and fourteen voted against it.
See Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Vintage,
2002) 536-539; Dwight Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York:
Norton, 1981).
49
Blumenthal and Morone 109-110.
33

Democratic candidates she   found   as   “too liberal.”      Her   support   for   Eisenhower   proved  
instrumental for Republican success in Texas. The new president reciprocated by making Hobby
the director of the Federal Security Agency, which soon became the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare.50
Among the other candidates for the Secretary post was Nelson A. Rockefeller. Grandson
of the co-founder of Standard Oil, John D. Rockefeller, Nelson had become a leading figure in
the liberal wing of the Republican Party. Before 1953, Rockefeller had worked within both the
Roosevelt and Truman Administrations as a leader on international policy. In the private sector,
he   managed   many   of   his   family’s   oil,   banking,   and   philanthropic   organizations. Four weeks
after Dwight Eisenhower won election, the president-elect named Rockefeller chairman of the
newly created Special Committee on Government Organization. The committee was tasked to
“study   and   make   recommendations   on   the   operation   and   structure   of   the   executive   branch.”    
Following his tenure with the Eisenhower Administration, Rockefeller went on to become
governor of New York, a presidential candidate in 1964, and vice-president to Gerald Ford.51
Among the thirteen reorganization plans the committee (renamed the Advisory
Committee on Government Reorganization when Eisenhower took office) submitted, was the
creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to take the over the responsibilities
of the Federal Security Agency.

Following   the   committee’s   recommendation,   Dwight  

Eisenhower   submitted   “Reorganization   Plan   No.   1   of   1953”   to   Congress   on   March   12,   1953.    
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Under the plan, a new department would   be   created   to   oversee   “Federal   activities   in   health,  
education,   and   social   welfare.”

The plan stipulated that a secretary would head the new

department, and the secretary would be supported by an undersecretary and two assistant
secretaries. The president stated that the plan was intended to improve the administration of the
various fields that had fallen under the purview of the FSA. Eisenhower contended that the
“importance   and   magnitude”   of   these   responsibilities   dictated   a   need   to   elevate   the   area   to  
cabinet  position  in  order  to  “give  the  needed  additional  assurance  that  these  matters will receive
the  full  consideration  they  deserve  in  the  whole  operation  of  the  Government.”52
After the president submitted the plan to Congress, he turned his attention to the
American  Medical  Association.    Speaking  to  the  AMA’s  House  of  Delegates,  Eisenhower stated
that the new department did not mean that the   AMA   should   “fear   his   administration   would  
become   ‘the   big   poobah’   of health   and   medical   services.”   Taft, who became majority leader
after 1952, reasoned that the proposal offered the only opportunity  to  “clean  out”  the  “entrenched
bureaucrats”  of  the  FSA.    Taft  called the  plan  “a  step  in  the  right  direction.”    The  AMA  voted  
175 to 8 in favor of the plan. On March 30th, both houses of Congress approved the plan.53
While Rockefeller had seen himself as a natural choice for the new cabinet position,
Hobby offered him the undersecretary position once she was made Secretary.

From the

beginning of his tenure as undersecretary, Rockefeller pursued an increase in Social Security
coverage. Initially focusing on smaller options, such as increased funding for cancer and heart
disease research, his plans took a distinctly larger shape when Rockefeller began to search for a
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solution to the 63 million Americans lacking health insurance. The undersecretary saw the
problem stemming from the refusal of insurance carriers to provide coverage to individuals
regarded as high-risk, or low-reward.      The   challenge,   as   Rockefeller   described   it,   “was   to  
promote experimentation on the part of timid private insurers. Using doctors connected to the
Rockefeller   Foundation,   Rockefeller   came   up   with   a   plan   of   “reinsurance”   in   the   summer   of  
1953.      Rockefeller’s   scheme   attempted, through government-sponsored guarantees, to entice
private and non-profit organizations into expanding   coverage.   These   guarantees   would   “insure  
the  insurers”  by  compensating  insurance  carriers  against  a  share  of  the  losses  that  accompanied  
extended coverage and benefits.54
Once Rockefeller and his team had formulated the plan, he presented it to Hobby in
November of 1953. Hobby consulted with Rockefeller, Dr. Chester Keefer (special assistant for
the department’s  Health  and  Medical  Affairs  Division),  and  Keefer’s  assistant,  M.  Allen  Pond.    
Hobby then placed the reinsurance proposal on a list of the department’s   potential   legislative  
plans and submitted it to the White House in December. While reinsurance was towards the
bottom  of  the  department’s  list,  it  “caught  the  eye”  of  Cabinet  Secretary  Maxwell  Rabb.    Seeing  
reinsurance as fitting into the administration’s   “middle   way,”   Rabb   instructed   Hobby   and  
Rockefeller to take the plan back to their department in order to provide more details.
With approval from the White House, Oveta Culp Hobby and Nelson Rockefeller
established a task force to create a formal proposal.

C. Manton Eddy, vice-president of

Connecticut General Life, chaired   the   committee   that   included   numerous   “high   powered”  
insurance executives, as well as members of HEW. When the proposal emerged in January of
1954, it reflected Dwight Eisenhower’s  stated  commitment  to  acting  liberally  in  areas  of  human  
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need.    While  Eisenhower  would  not  become  an  “active  salesman”  in  the  early  stages  of  the  push  
for reinsurance, his belief that the federal government had a role to play in the well being of its
people led the president to support the proposal whole-heartedly. This belief placed reinsurance
into  the  greater  dialogue  of  the  federal  government’s  role  in  the  everyday  lives  of  its  citizens.55

The fear of economic instability that had plagued the United States in the decade before
World War II again took center-stage after the war. Facing massive unemployment, the federal
government employed Keynesian-style demand management by drastically increasing
government spending towards reaching full employment. While government spending in the
1930s proved unable to end the depression, exponentially increased federal expenditures during
World War II brought full employment and a booming economy. Furthermore, it seemed to
prove   Keynes’s   theory.      In   the   years   after the war, federal economic decision making, led by
Leon Keyserling and the Council of Economic Advisers, focused on maintaining aggregate
demand in the economy as the foundation for sustaining American economic security. Whereas
the federal government had stimulated the economy through military spending before the war,
post-war spending focused on increasing consumer purchasing power through a number of
avenues such as minimum wage increases and greater unemployment compensation.56
As prevailing economic theory came to support consumption as key to strengthening an
uncertain post-war economy, historian Lizabeth Cohen found that a new debate regarding the
extent to which the government would intervene economically began to grow. Conservative
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business interests, led by the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce,   fought   to   increase   free   enterprise   by   removing   New   Deal   initiatives.      “Moderate”  
business, such as the Committee for Economic Development, also supported free enterprise
plans, but proved open to cooperation with the government. Labor, and other groups on the left,
wanted   government   intervention   to   ensure   “mass   purchasing   power”   in   order   to   ensure   full  
employment and large market that provided a high-volume of production.57
The Employment Act of 1946 defined federal social responsibility   as   “promot[ing]  
maximum  employment,  production,  and  purchasing  power.”    While  conservatives  opposed  this  
philosophy on many fronts, Cohen argued that nearly all interests at this time supported federal
defense expenditures. Along with defense spending, increased government supports, such as
housing and highway construction, unemployment insurance, and social security, took hold and
added to the post-war combination of private and public spending for social welfare projects.
Cohen contended that Dwight Eisenhower typified this new understanding of federal
participation   in   the   private   sector.      Eisenhower’s   definition of such federal spending in these
areas as “crucial”   demonstrated the new common ground shared by Democrats and liberal
Republicans. The new debate on and public conceptions of state participation no longer centered
on whether the government should be involved, but too what extent.58
With government involvement becoming the new reality in the United States, private
interests were forced to adapt. Historian Wendy Wall stated that these groups understood the
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advance of federal authority in the context of the growth of socialism and communism.
Communist parties in France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia had become major political entities,
while communism threatened to take over China and many Latin American nations. Most
disturbing to American business, according to Wall, was the defeat of Winston Churchill through
democratic election. These interests worried that if an avowedly socialist opposition could
defeat  Great  Britain’s  wartime  hero,  then  “creeping  state  socialism”  might  take  hold  again  in  the  
United States.

As hundreds of thousands of American workers began to strike in 1945

simultaneously with race riots and growing juvenile delinquency, some in American industry
believed it necessary to   “re-sell  Americanism  to   Americans”  as  a  countermeasure  to   American  
socialism. For Wendy Wall, the Advertising Council’s “American  Way”  campaign typified this
attempt. The campaign utilized education, movies, radio, television, and advertising, in order to
encourage “national  unity” by creating the impression  that  “a  consensus  on  America’s  unifying  
values”  existed  at  the  nation’s  core.59
As communism continued to spread, both globally and in the United States, Wall found
the campaigns began to shift toward promoting capitalism by arguing that free enterprise was
essential to individual freedom. Thus, when Harry Truman was elected in 1948, the National
Association of Manufactures, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and numerous other business
interests  attempted  to  curb  Truman’s  expansion of the New Deal. They claimed that such federal
involvement opposed the previously established core American values of free enterprise and
individual freedom. Their subsequent campaigns focused on selling the public on the idea that
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American democratic values required an economy free from government interference. This
ideology would present one of the major obstacles to federal reinsurance.60
In addition to the developing public fear of socialism and a divided Republican Party,
Democrats in Congress provided yet another source of opposition to Dwight  Eisenhower’s  health  
reinsurance proposal.

Despite numerous similarities between Democrats and liberal

Republicans, Democratic pursuit of a significantly larger role for the federal government in
American health care precluded their support for reinsurance. The growing concept of an
“American   way”   defined   by   its   adherence   to   free   enterprise   offered   business   interests,   such   as  
the American Medical Association and the insurance industry, a platform to continue their
opposition to increased federal entrance into the field of health insurance as socialistic or antidemocratic.
Despite their understanding of the political climate, the Eisenhower Administration also
understood that millions of Americans lacked the ability to pay for medical care and that this
demanded a solution. With pressure for some form of change building, the administration chose
to fashion a solution that might appeal to both sides of the political spectrum. The subsequent
struggle over reinsurance illustrated how health insurance demonstrated differing conceptions of
the social responsibilities of the federal government in modern America.
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Chapter Three:
Health  Insurance  in  the  “Middle  Way”  Presidency

On the same day that the House of Representatives debated the health reinsurance
legislation, President Eisenhower wrote a letter to his friend Brigadier General Bradford G.
Chynoweth.      Regarding   Chynoweth’s   opposition   to   Eisenhower’s   “middle   way”   approach   to  
social welfare, the  president  wrote  “It  seems  to  me that no great intelligence is required in order
to discern the practical necessity of establishing some kind of security for individuals in a
specialized   and   highly   industrialized   society.”      Eisenhower   reasoned   that   the   security   once  
provided   “by   the   existence   of   free   land   and a great mass of untouched and valuable resources
throughout   our   country”   no   longer   remained   “for   the   asking.”      While   he   understood that
historical forms of security lacked the ability to support Americans and this required some
response, Eisenhower warned against swaying too far towards federal security guarantees by
pushing   “further   and   further   into   the   socialistic   experiment.”      This   experiment,   according   to  
Eisenhower,  would  weaken  an  individual’s  ability  to  provide  for  him or herself.    “Excluding  the  
field   of   moral   values,”   Eisenhower   stated,   “anything   that   affects   or   is   proposed   for   masses   of  
humans   is   wrong   if   the   position   it   seeks   is   at   either   end   of   possible   argument.”
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The   rejection   of   “either   end   of   the   argument”   encompassed   Eisenhower’s   approach   to
politics.

He refused to remove the supports of the New Deal, while combating efforts to

significantly expand it. Michael S. Mayer, in The Eisenhower Years, classified Eisenhower as
“something   of   an   American   Disraeli.”      Mayer   finds   that   Eisenhower’s   expansion of social
security, increasing of the minimum wage, undertaking of massive public works projects, and
61

Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press,
2006), 7.
41

proposed health and education initiatives can be seen in the same way that the conservative
British   leader,   Benjamin   Disraeli,   “stole   the   Liberal’s   thunder”   in   Great   Britain.      Not   only   did  
Eisenhower believe in limited social security measures, he saw reform as a means of preempting
more radical options. Thus when the Federal Security Agency (FSA) found that significant
issues existed in American health care as Eisenhower entered office, the new president
approached  the  problem  through  his  “middle  way.”62
By the time Dwight Eisenhower took office on January 20, 1953, health care reform
seemed to be at an impasse. For the previous half decade, the health industry had opposed plans
for compulsory health insurance, while the government continued to search for a solution to
solve the problem of access to health care. A divide existed between the high quality of
American medicine and the ability of individuals to take advantage of it. Would the pursuit of
health care coverage follow the previous course towards state-sponsored health coverage? Or
would the private sector dominate the field?

In 1954, Dwight Eisenhower presented his

administration’s   answer, federal reinsurance of existing voluntary health insurance in order to
reduce costs and expand access.
In   order   to   provide   a   fuller   understanding   of   the   Eisenhower   administration’s   proposed  
program, this chapter will examine the ideas and events leading up to the congressional hearings
on the proposed reinsurance legislation. While health reinsurance involved an incursion of
federal power into an area predominately occupied by private industry, it continued to leave
significant room for private enterprise.    Although  Eisenhower’s  plan  certainly  offered  an  option  
that ran counter to many of the general free market beliefs of the health care industry, it made
significant efforts to incorporate such ideas into the planning for reinsurance. The program
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therefore offered a middle ground between national health insurance and the existing private
structure.

The Federal Security Agency released its findings on the state of health coverage in the
United States, on January 4, 1953. With private insurance only covering between thirteen and
seventeen percent of the “personal  costs  of  sickness”  in  1951, the FSA stated that private health
insurance was proving inadequate. While it found that about half of the nation had health
insurance, it argued that it was clearly not effective; 83 to 87 percent of medical costs incurred
by those participating in voluntary health plans had to be paid by the individual. In response, the
American Medical Association claimed that by including only private health insurance in their
coverage statistics,  the  FSA  and  its  “compulsory  health  insurance  schemers”  misrepresented  the  
numbers in   an  “obvious  attempt  by   a  lame-duck administrator to discredit the voluntary health
insurance programs.”      The AMA claimed that the FSA should not have included individuals
without insurance, as many chose not to buy it. They also claimed that many medical bills were
paid   by   other   sources   such   as   workmen’s   compensation,   liability   insurance,   and   private  
philanthropic foundations, thus skewing the statistics.63
In an attempt to repair much of this division, Secretary Oveta Culp Hobby (of the newly
created Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) addressed the House of Delegates of the
American Medical Association at their at the annual meeting in June of 1953.      “There   is   little  
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controversy   on   our   objective,”   she   told   the   delegates.      The   administration   wanted   to   ensure  
“the best medical care possible for the people. It is the means to this end which raise the
problems we face in achieving this purpose.”    Her  speech  focused on the problems of American
health care and the administration’s  proposals  to  solve  them.64
She prefaced her presentation by stating that any government provisions must  fall  “within  
the  democratic  principle…In  Democracy,  no  one  need  walk  alone,  but  he  does  his  own  walking.”    
Under this guidance, Hobby rejected compulsory health insurance as a clear break from
democratic values. She argued that socialized medicine not only violated democratic tenets of
free choice and consent, but also that it was economically unsound. While socialized medicine
might potentially provide the democratic right to “equal   opportunity   for   medical   care.”      In   the  
long-term, it would impair the previously stated democratic principles. “Socialized  medicine is
not a satisfactory solution of our problem,”  she maintained, and she pondered the alternatives. In
search of an answer, Hobby stated that the administration looked to doctors, individual
Americans, and communities to find these alternative solutions. While these groups had to lead
the way, she told the delegates that the Eisenhower administration believed “that under a
democratic system, the government ha[d] an important role  to  play.”    She closed her speech by
imploring the delegates to continue to increase the existing cooperation between the medical
field and the government. The following day, the chairman of the AMA’s   Board   of   Trustees,

64

“American  Medicine  in  a  Changing  Society,”  Address  to  House  of  Delegates  at  the  Annual  
Meeting of the American Medical Assoc. by Oveta Culp Hobby, June 1,1953, Monday, June 1,
1953-Annual Meeting of The American Medical Association-New York. Address to the House
of Delegates by O.C.H., Box 34, Oveta Culp Hobby Papers, DDEL.
44

Dwight Murray, sent  a  letter  to  Secretary  Hobby  assuring  her  “of  the  desire  of  the  Association  to  
cooperate with  you  in  any  way  possible.”65
While the administration attempted to lessen the ideological divide in the field of health
care coverage, it had to face the increasingly contentious atmosphere inherent in an issue of such
a personal nature. In response to this health care divide, the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce convened a series of hearings in October and November of 1953 to evaluate
“the  overall problem of health legislation” and the course that such legislation should take. One
of the committee members, Congressman John W. Heselton (R, MA), sent a letter to Sherman
Adams, the White House chief of staff summarizing the hearings, which included testimony
from experts in various fields, including medicine, insurance, labor, and industry. Heselton
found  that  the  hearings  “amounted  to  a  symposium  on  the  advances  that  have  been  made and an
estimate   on   what   could   be   done.” The congressman told Adams that the chairman of the
committee, Charles Wolverton (R, NJ), came out of the hearings primarily focused on finding a
solution  to  the  problem  of  “catastrophic  illnesses.”    
Upon returning home from Washington to discuss such a solution with his constituent
base, Heselton came to realize how hotly debated the problems regarding a solution to
catastrophic illnesses had become at the local level. He further discerned that  “some,  if  not  all,  
of the old-line insurance companies recognize the problem and want to be given an opportunity
to  solve  it.” With many in the public seeing the administration’s  image  as  one  of  “a  big  business  
operation, totally uninterested in the problems of average men  and  women,”  he  argued  that  the  
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field  offers  “the  best  single  answer  to  the  demagogic  critics  of  the  Administration.” He therefore
told Adams that it should be included in the president’s   State   of   the   Union   address.      The
administration agreed.

HEW undersecretary, Nelson A. Rockefeller supported Hesleton’s  

assessment  that  the  “problem  of  major  medical  expense  (or  catastrophic illness) is important and
of genuine concern to the average American   family.”      Rockefeller   then   advised   President
Eisenhower to refer to it in the upcoming State of the Union address.66
After the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had formulated its proposal for
new health reform legislation, Secretary Hobby and her staff presented the plan to the
Republican legislative leadership meeting on December 17, 1953. President Eisenhower used
the body as a method of communication with Congress, as well as a way of consolidating
Republican congressional support for the administration’s legislative proposals. Hobby began by
stating that the problem with American health care was not with its quality, but its availability.
Despite popular support for health care reform as witnessed by the 100 various health proposals
offered in the previous congressional session alone,   “all   such legislation has come to naught.”    
The assistant secretary of HEW, Dr. Chester Keefer added that with respect to this lack of

66

Congressman John W. Heselton to Sherman Adams, November 3, 1953, OF 117-C-7 Medical
Practice-Doctors, Health Insurance (1), Box 509, Official File, Records of Dwight D.
Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, DDEL; Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to The Assistant to the President, November 23, 1953, OF 117-C-7 Medical
Practice-Doctors, Health Insurance (1), Box 509, Official File, Records of Dwight D.
Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, DDEL.
46

coverage, the primary issue was the “high costs, especially in regards to chronic and long-term
illnesses.”67
Dr. Keefer continued by presenting several figures representing health insurance
coverage in the United States. He first showed the dramatic increase in the percent of the
American population that participated in voluntary health insurance programs, which had grown
from eight percent in 1940 to 59 percent in 1952. While insurance participation may have
increased, he showed that the percent of benefits paid relative to total medical costs (six percent
in 1940 to 39 percent in 1952) had not grown at the same rate. Keefer further illustrated this
divide  by  illustrating  the  “uneven   coverage”  for  the  59  percent   of   Americans  covered. In five
urban and wealthy states, 85 percent of the population was covered by insurance. While in five
rural and poor states, only 24 percent of the population received coverage.68
Hobby continued by presenting the goal and pursuant policies that would guide the
administration’s  upcoming  health  program, which intended to  close  the  gap  seen  in  Dr.  Keefer’s  
statistics. The primary aim of the program was   “to   increase   cooperation   between   private   and  
public  to  encourage  private  expansion.” The program would provide “good  health  for  all  as  vital  
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to security and prosperity”   and   special help to the indigent where health insurance is not
practicable,”  while  staying  committed  to  maintaining  the  “traditional doctor patient relationship.”    
The secretary argued that private organizations could meet these goals, provided they received
support from the federal government. She told the congressional leaders that this support should
come in the form of a federally created reinsurance  fund  that  would  “guarantee,  for  a premium,
insurance  companies  against  losses  from  broadened  benefits  and  broadened  coverage.”69
As an example, Dr. Keefer discussed how reinsurance would generally work if applied to
Blue Cross. In order for the organization to receive support from the reinsurance fund, they
would need to increase their services outside of the their usual area of hospitalization coverage.
Keefer noted that 65 to 75 percent of medical care was given outside of hospitals; reinsurance
would promote the expansion of coverage to an area of significant need.
When the president asked what the role of the federal government would be in such a
plan, Dr. Keefer responded that its foremost role would be the provision of funds to protect
against catastrophic losses. These resources   would   come   from   a   “revolving”   reinsurance   fund  
“at   rates   high   enough   to   protect   the   government,”   as   well   as   to   maintain   the   fund’s   monetary  
levels. Therefore federal reinsurance  would  operate  as  a  “loan  guarantee  for  a  fee  to  help  new  
plans and to help expansion   of   existing   plans.” In addition, the fund would set the yet to be
determined requirements necessary for insurance plans to become reinsured, as well as act as the
fund’s  supervisory  body.    
The legislative leadership meeting then turned to the matter of who would oversee the
premiums, an area where states generally had acted as the regulatory body.

As states
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consistently prevented insurance companies from operating at a loss, many of the meeting’s  
members questioned why there was even a need to insure against losses. Rockefeller responded
by  claiming,  among  the  many  potential  reasons   for  promoting  such  a  plan,  that  it  would  “head  
off any Federal program   of   ‘socialized’   medicine.”      Rockefeller   added,   “there   are bills in the
hopper which go gar beyond.” When Senate President Pro-Tempore Styles Bridges (R, NH)
stated that it  appeared  as  if  the  program  was  “pushing state and local governments into a big new
program,” Keefer responded that it was not  “forcing” them.
When   the   members   asked   about   the   medical   profession’s   reaction   to   the   plan,   Hobby  
conveyed surprising confidence in their potential reaction. While she had not yet presented it to
the AMA, Hobby doubted the   plan   would   encounter   “much   opposition”   from   the   medical  
profession. When Dr. Keefer stated that he had not yet checked with the Blue Cross or the Blue
Shield, Hobby expressed confidence that they would not likely present much support or
opposition yet, but would offer only their general position that they could not “say yet because of
a  lack  of  actuarial  knowledge.”70
The  meeting  closed  with  Hobby’s  discussion of the proposed cost of the plan. When she
added the cost of grants ($30 million), surveys ($2 million), and salaries ($400,000), she
approximated the total cost of the program at $32 million. When Rockefeller submitted the
estimated budget for the administration’s  proposed  health  reinsurance the Bureau of the Budget
on December 28, the number had shrunk. The estimate for the principle funding was revised
downward to $25  million.    Salaries  and  expenses  (for  the  first  five  years),  as  well  as  the  “special  
actuarial studies and services,” were estimated at $1 million and $200,000 respectively. The
proposal   also   requested   a   “specified   appropriation”   for   the   fiscal   years   of 1955 and 1956 “to  
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insure   prompt   initiation   of   this   special   program.”   The amount requested for 1955 was $5
million, while the amount for 1956 was $17 million. The administration then released its general
plan to the public.71
On December 23, The New York Post ran an article covering the administration’s new
health insurance program, to be tentatively titled the  “National  Health  Act  of  1954,” that would
be presented during the president’s  State  of  the  Union  address. In the article, Secretary Hobby
emphasized  three  points  in  her  explanation  of  the  “still unannounced health program.”    First,  “It
will  be  wholly  voluntary.    Unlike  the  rebuffed  Truman  proposal,  the  Administration’s  project  has  
nothing remotely compulsory   about   it.”      Second, Hobby stated that it would be up to the
“individuals   in   states   and   communities   to   initiate   and   operate   the   health   plans…The   Federal  
government  will  impose  nothing  on  anyone.”    Hobby concluded that it would not be necessary to
increase the federal budget substantially, as   the   government’s   cost   would   be   small. The New
York Post reported that the plan was born out of the administration’s  belief  that  “the  great  mass  
of Americans are not getting adequate medical care, are aware of this and are demanding
measures  be  taken  to  meet  this  need.” While conceding that numerous  “voluntary  prepayment  
health   services”   were   already in operation, Hobby emphasized that the cost of these existing
plans were more   than   most   Americans   could   afford.      “The primary purpose of the
Administration’s  program,”  she  explained, “is  to  expand  the  inclusiveness  of  the  private  plans.”72
On January 6, 1954, Eisenhower wrote to his brother Milton, who was one of the
president’s closest advisors. The president had continuously maintained regular correspondence
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with his brother throughout their adult lives. The letter focused on the actions available to the
government in taking an active role in sustaining the prosperity of the United States. While the
president contended that the extent of federal obligation and authority varied with the times, he
believed   that   “in these days I am sure that the government has to be the principal coordinator
and,   in   many   cases,   the   actual   operator.”

These mechanisms included several potential

government actions, including: tax law revision, direct loans and grants, increased governmentsponsored  construction  projects,  soil  conservation,  water  storage,  public  housing,  as  well  as  “all
types  of  reinsurance  plans.”    Eisenhower trusted his brother completely and confided in him, thus
this letter provided an accurate indication  of  Eisenhower’s  thinking.73
The State of the Union address in 1954 was divided into three areas: foreign affairs, a
strong economy, and human problems. After covering issues such as the Korean War, increased
aggressions in the Middle East, and a proposed tax cut, President Eisenhower turned his attention
to  the  state  of  American  health.    “I am flatly opposed to the socialization of medicine,”  he  began.    
While he stated his faith in private options as the best means to meet the rising costs of medical
care,  he  argued,  “the Federal Government can do many helpful things and still carefully avoid
the socialization of medicine.”    The  president listed options such as supporting medical research,
health rehabilitation, and the construction of new medical facilities. This was not enough for the
president,  who  contended  that  the  “war  on  disease”  required  an  improved relationship between
the government and private initiative. In order to combine the existing private and non-profit
insurance plans with federal   support,   Eisenhower   proposed   the   creation   of   a   “limited
Government reinsurance service.”    He  specified  that  the  goal  of  the  program  was  to  allow  private  
and non-profit insurance   companies   the   ability   to   offer   increased   protections   “to   more of the
73
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many families which want and should have it.”    The  president closed his coverage health matters
by saying he would forward the plan to Congress on January 18, at which point he would present
the  details  of  the  administration’s  plan.74
Before January 18th arrived, the administration had already begun to receive limited
support for their plan from the medical profession. On January 13, Dr. U.R. Bryner, president of
the American Academy of General Practice, sent a letter to Eisenhower. He began by voicing
his full support for the president’s   recent   speech   on   the   State   of   the   Union.      In   particular,   Dr.  
Bryner   was   elated   to   hear   Eisenhower   say   that   he   “flatly   opposed”   socialized   medicine.      That  
single statement, backed by the acts of the administration would “do   more   to   keep   socialized  
medicine from being a part of the American life than anything that has been said or done for the
part   twenty   years.” Bryner then discussed a recent trip he took to Great Britain with the
American Medical Association, where the group studied the effect of socialized medicine on
medical services received by British patients. The group concluded that “beyond   any   doubt”  
socialization was destroying both the ability of British individuals to choose their care provider
as well as the quality of that care. While Bryner was obviously an opponent of socialized
medicine, he shared the president’s   belief   that   the   government   had   a   limited   role   to play in
America’s   health care. According to Bryner, that role should be limited to stimulating and
nurturing private endeavors and “only  as  its  need  is  absolutely  proven  necessary.”    He  closed the
letter by giving the president his   “entire   support.”      On February 3, Eisenhower responded to
Bryner, thanking him for his support. The president stated his belief that the only way for
Americans   to   receive   the   “best   health   which   modern   science   makes   possible”   was   for  
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professional   groups,   such   as   Bryner’s,   are   able to come together with the various groups of
involved  citizens  and  the  government  “in  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  way.”75
In response to requests from various New York newspapers, Charles Garside, president
of the Blue Cross of New York released a statement on the proposed federal reinsurance plan.
His press release on January 17 began by stating that the proposal to cover catastrophic illness
appeared “entirely  feasible.”    Garside  argued  that  while  the  costs  of  “catastrophic  hospitalization  
[was]  negligible”  to  Blue  Cross,  for  families  who  faced  such  hospitalization,  “the  catastrophic  is  
anything  but  negligible.”    He  noted  the  general  success  of  Blue  Cross’s  coverage.    In  the  New  
York City area, 94 percent of percent of their subscribers were discharged in less than three
weeks. Of those subscribers who used Blue Cross member hospitals, 90 percent had their
hospital  bills  paid  in  full.    In  the  relatively  few  instances  where  a  participant’s  catastrophic  case  
exceeded his or her benefits, he understood that reinsurance would cover the excess.76
Garside maintained that the insurance premiums of the 5,300,000 subscribers to New
York  City’s  Blue  Cross had to be applied toward the  “average  hospitalization  requirements.”    If  
his organization’s coverage were to be extended to cases of tremendous medical costs exceeding
individual benefits, such as chronic illness and chronic hospitalization, the Blue Cross would be
“unduly”  forced  to raise all subscription rates. Thus, Garside left room for federal reinsurance to
“eliminate   the   economic   tragedy   that   confronts   families   in   cases   of   catastrophic   illness.”
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“Obviously,”  he  conceded, “there will be problems to work out, but the proposal has great merit,
and should be explored, and if possible, implemented.”77
On January 18, 1954, Dwight Eisenhower sent his message  to  Congress  on  the  “Health  of  the  
American People.”  It began by laying out the current state of health in the United States. From a
19-year increase in average life span, to two-thirds reduction in child mortality rates, the
president found that the health of Americans during the previous fifty years had improved
dramatically.    He  attributed  this  success  to  the  “partnership  and  teamwork”  within  the  numerous  
public and private medical entities. Despite the gains Eisenhower noted, he moved on to discuss
the existing problems of American health. Cancer, heart disease, and diabetes were increasingly
affecting millions of Americans.

While the nation had numerous capacities to reduce the

growing figures,  they  were  not  available  “where  and  when  they  [were] needed.”    This  disparity  
led  to  the  “two  key  problems  in  the  field  of  health  today,” availability of medical treatment and
the costs associated with medical care.

Assuming that medical care was available to an

individual,   “its   costs   [were] often   a   serious   burden.”      Long-term, major illnesses for average
American families often became  “a  financial  catastrophe.”78
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While he argued that action was required, Eisenhower cautioned that any solution must not
interfere with the established relationship between doctor and patient, or the freedom of the
individual to select the manner of his or her care.    “In  adhering  to  this  principle,  and  rejecting  the  
socialization of medicine,”  he  said, “we can still confidently commit ourselves to certain national
health   goals.”     In  order   for  this  to   occur,  he  called  for  the  most  complete  cooperation  possible  
between the citizens, physicians, research scientists, schools, and especially between public and
private institutions. The subsequent recommendations were “designed to bring us closer to these
goals.”
In order for Americans to provide themselves with the ability to gain quality medical care,
the president advocated participation in voluntary health-insurance plans. The dramatic growth
of such plans indicated to the administration  that  voluntary  providers  could  reach  “more  people  
and  provide  better  and  broader  benefits”  than  the government could. “The  government  need  not  
and should not go into the insurance business.” Nonetheless, Eisenhower maintained that it
should work with these voluntary programs to develop improved insurance protections in order
to meet the existing public need.79
With the issues and guiding principles laid out, President Eisenhower recommended the
creation  of  a  “limited  Federal  reinsurance  service”  that  would  encourage  both  private  and  nonprofit health insurance companies to broaden their coverage. The fund would reinsure these
organizations against the additional risks that would follow such an increase in protections. The
fund would be launched with $25 million of government capital and would be supported by
reinsurance fees paid by the carriers. The message closed with a plea for Congress to consider
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the president’s   recommendations favorably.      “No   nation   and   no   administration,”   declared  
Eisenhower, “can  ever  afford  to  be  complacent  about  the  health  of  its  citizens.”    While  this  could  
not  mean  the  “regimentation  of  medicine,” he stressed that it must mean a continued dedication
to the discovery   and  implementation   of  “new  methods  of  achieving  better  health  for   all  of  our  
people.”80
Before the reinsurance legislation reached congressional committee hearings, public
interest into health care and related health care legislation had begun to increase. From February
15 through the 18, The Washington Daily News ran a series of three articles covering upcoming
congressional  “probes”  into  health  insurance.    The  first  article  titled,  “The  Gimmicks  of  Health  
Insurance,” focused on a lack of insurance coverage for major, chronic illnesses. The article
found that in such cases, most existing plans had the ability either to cancel a policy whenever it
chose or   refuse   to   renew   one’s   policy   when   the   next   premiums   came due. The next article
focused on “What  the  Government  is  going  to  do  about  it.” It discussed the two congressional
committees and one federal  agency  that  were  currently  “taking  long  looks  at  the  thriving  health  
insurance   business.”

The House Interstate Commerce Committee was considering various

proposals for government support for private insurance companies, while it also listened to
“outspoken  testimony  against  ‘a  fatal  shortcoming’  of  most  individual  policies  – the  company’s  
much-used  right  to  take  away  a  person’s  policy  when  his  health  fails.”    The  final  article  focused  
more   intently   on   the   Commerce   Committee’s   investigation   into   the   “inequities”   of   several  
insurance policies. The Daily News article said that the committee was waiting to make any
significant decisions until the administration  announced  the  details  of  its  proposed  “Government  
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assistance   of   some   health   protection   plans”   so   that   it   could   combine   its   inquiry   with   “any  
proposed  set  of  standards  for  companies  which  might  want  Government  ‘reinsurance.’”81
On February   26,   the   president’s   cabinet heard the final reinsurance proposal from the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. After assessing the recent growth of various
health insurance programs and pointing to the existing need for an extension in coverage and
benefits, Hobby proposed the creation of a federal reinsurance fund that would be voluntarily
available to both private and non-profit organizations. According to the proposal, reinsurance
would   encourage   these   organizations   to   “experiment”   with   extensions of service that would
likely not occur because of the  financial  hazards  involved.    After  “minor  comment”  regarding  the  
program’s  potential  success, the proposal was approved.82
With the reinsurance proposal now approved by both the legislative leaders and the
cabinet, the administration presented the full details of plan to Congress as well as the public.
Hobby met the press on March 11th. Her press  conference  began  with  Hobby’s  statement of the
belief that the president’s  reinsurance program offered  “new  hope  for  coping  with  many  of  the  
health problems which confront  the  American  people.”    While the quality of American medicine
had seen tremendous progress, she deplored the fact that many American families were unable to
make use of such progress. In order to address the existing lack of health insurance coverage for
an  inordinate  number  of  Americans,  Hobby  presented  the  administration’s  plan  for  a  $25  million  
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federal  reinsurance  service.    The  service  was  intended  to  “encourage”  existing  voluntary   health
insurance  plans  to  “offer  broader  and  better  insurance  protection  against  the  cost  of  illness.”    The  
plan  would  allow  insurance  providers  to  test  new  types  of  “actuarial  risks”  that  they  “might  not  
wish  to  assume  alone.”83
While Hobby did not guarantee the eventual results of the program, the administration
anticipated that it would likely offer several improvements. First and foremost was an increase
in health insurance coverage. The administration further expected to see a reduced number of
“exclusions  from  coverage”  that  existed  under  various  types  of  health  policies.  “With  respect  to  
the   total   limits   of   health   insurance”   she   expected   a   broadening   of   comprehensive   benefits   “in  
order to reach more effectively into the areas of catastrophic illness.”     Those benefits included
greater number of hospitalization days to be paid by insurance, the removal of certain age
restrictions  in  policies  so  that  “more  older  persons  may  continue  to  have  the protection of health
insurance,”  and  new insurance coverage for individuals  “now  considered  uninsurable”.    Finally,  
the  “development  of  health  insurance  programs  that  will  be  realistic  in  terms  of  paying  the  costs  
of  early  diagnosis  and  treatment  of  chronic  diseases.”
Despite her cautious optimism, Hobby acknowledged that the plan would face certain
limitations. First, reinsurance would affect only individuals who were willing to participate in
health insurance. Again, as the plan would cover only  those  insured,  it  “may  not   immediately  
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solve some of the problems of coverage for the aged.” The final limitation of reinsurance came
from  the  willingness  of  private  organizations  to  utilize  the  service  to  assume  “new  and  broader  
risks.” “This  recommendation,”  she  noted,  “is built on a sensible base of voluntary participation,
private   operation,   and   government   leadership.”   Hobby’s   press   statement ended by reaffirming
that the administration’s   belief   that voluntary, private and nonprofit health insurance provided
the   “best   means”   of   closing   the   gap   between   quality   of   medical care available and the care
received.84
In  order  to   provide  a  fuller  account   of  the   administration’s  plans,  Hobby   prepared  over  
thirty answers to potential questions following her statement. “What  is  reinsurance  and  what  are  
you  reinsuring?”    Hobby  explained that reinsurance, simply stated, spread risk between two or
more carriers beyond the initial pooling of an individual carrier.

In the case of federal

reinsurance, the established fund would insure carriers against 75 percent of losses from
approved prepayment plans in a given year. She emphasized that the plan did not provide
protection against particular risks, but rather insured “against loss from the operation of a plan.”    
The proposal, Hobby contended, would “make   more   comprehensive   care   available to more
people at a cost they can   afford   to   pay,” but the success of the plan would be completely
dependent  on  the  “ingenuity  and  voluntary  action  of  insurance  carriers.” In short, these carriers
would be the parties responsible for writing more comprehensive and affordable policies. These
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protections would be available to any carrier that offered a prepayment health insurance plan that
met “certain  minimum  standards  of  eligibility.”85
Distinguishing the administration’s plan from socialized medicine, Hobby stated that
such a socialized system would include three elements: compulsion, federal operation, and the
“restriction   of   the   right   of   free-choice   of   physicians.”      Thus   the   “completely   voluntary”  
reinsurance program was neither socialization, nor an “opening   wedge”  to   federal operation of
insurance regulation. While some could construe reinsurance as such a wedge if it operated as a
federal subsidy, the secretary clarified how the fund differed. Federal funding would support the
initial   capital   and   first   five   years   of   “administrative   expenses,”   yet the fund was designed to
support itself through reinsurance premiums rates to be set by the federal government under the
advice of both private and public entities. Additionally, the federal government would not have
authority over insurance premiums for participating carriers.86
The  response  to  a  question  asking  if  the  “original bill [would] have to be toned down to
meet   AMA   objections,”   the   secretary stated that she had seen not the American Medical
Association take a position on the program yet, and was not aware of any objections.
“Apparently  you  disagree  with  the  AMA  which  said  that  insurance  companies  could  do  this  job  
if they were left alone?”      Hobby   asserted   the administration’s belief that insurance companies
could “do   it   and   will   do   it   insofar   as   the   prepayment   method   is   suitable”   was   reflected   in   the  
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plan’s   reliance   on   existing   firms.      According   to   Hobby,   the   plan   intended   only to   “encourage  
carriers   to   move   more   rapidly”   as   well   as   to   be   more   “venturesome.”      With   the   plan   now  
submitted for public consideration, it faced congressional approval, its biggest challenge yet.87

In its first year of office, the Eisenhower administration put together its answer to the
problems of American health care coverage by recognizing two facts. They recognized first that
Americans with low income, chronic illness, or of advanced age were largely unable to get
health insurance, which could result in significant financial hardships. While the administration
understood this problem, they also rejected socialized medicine as the solution. Eisenhower
firmly opposed such a solution, which he believed diverged from the democratic tenets of free
choice and consent. In   order   to   solve   the   nation’s   health dilemma while also heading off
socialized medicine, Eisenhower sought to continue a limited liberal policy as a means of
preventing radical change. This   typified   Eisenhower’s   general   approach   to   social   policy,   an  
approach that marked him as a Tory reformer.
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Chapter Four:
We Are Against Socialized Medicine, But What Are We For?88
“In  all  things  which  deal  with  people  be  liberal,  be  human.    In  all  things  which  deal  with  
the   people’s   money   or   their   economy,   or   their   form   of   government,   be   conservative.”      These  
instructions from President Dwight Eisenhower to the secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Oveta Culp Hobby, aptly encompassed the president’s  “middle  way,”  or  Tory  reformstyle conservatism. While the administration had maintained a philosophical ideal that it should
help people to help themselves, it also concluded that it was the duty of the federal government
to  “cushion  the  shock  of  personal  disaster”  for  the  individuals  unable  to  help  themselves. In this
way, the provision of limited federal guarantees could forestall radical change.89
Hobby   used   Eisenhower’s   statement at the beginning of her memorandum to the
president, dated November 18, 1954, which reflected on the  body  of  her  department’s  previous  
two years of work. She contended that in 1953, the  administration’s human welfare philosophies
had been embodied in the creation of HEW, whereas 1954 had addressed the problems of
“individual  security.” While the memorandum read optimistically, there was a clear deficiency.
Despite its stated commitment to solving the lack of coverage for a vast portion of Americans,
the  administration’s  plan  for  health  reinsurance was not among  the  administration’s  triumphs  of  
1954.

Shortly after reinsurance had been introduced to the public, a bill embodying the
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administration’s   principles went before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in
March of 1954. Only after fierce debate over the bill in committee, did the bill make it to the
floor of the House of Representatives in July, where it failed.90
While reinsurance illustrated a middle ground approach to the problems of health care
coverage, the battle for and against it revealed the dominant ideologies regarding government
intervention in American life. In the end, the bill failed. The private sector generally believed
that even this case of limited state intervention represented too much federal interference. For
those who   had   supported   Truman’s   national   health   insurance   plan,   reinsurance   proved   too  
limited. Medical and insurance organizations were some of the most outspoken opponents to the
plan. Midwestern conservative Republicans joined these organizations, as did Democrats. The
fate of health coverage in the 1950s was determined by a standoff between those who wanted
more and those who wanted less.

The  House  Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce  convened  at  ten  o’clock on
the morning of Wednesday, March 24th to begin its hearings on the proposed health reinsurance
plan. Oveta Culp Hobby appeared first and began by laying out the details of House Resolution
8356. The  primary  objective  of  the  bill,  Hobby  began,  was  “the  stimulation  of  voluntary  health  
insurance plans to do a more effective job in providing protection for our people against the
mounting costs of medical and hospital care.”    After  she  laid out the  administration’s  opposition
to socialized medicine, Hobby gave way to Dr. Chester Keefer, an assistant secretary of HEW.
Through a series of charts, Dr. Keefer illustrated the current state of health coverage in the
United States. He argued that a large portion of the American population did not have health
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insurance. Even for those who did have coverage, Keefer further argued that the scope of their
protection was not adequate.91
Once the assistant secretary had finished, Hobby continued to press the case.    “We  need,”  
she said, “more   and   better   voluntary   health   insurance…to   achieve   the   full   potential   of   private  
plans,  pioneering  efforts  must  continue.”    For  this  to  occur,  the  administration  believed  that  such  
plans needed encouragement to take on new risks. Reinsurance, which proposed sharing these
risks, would accomplish this.92
Hobby  continued  by  taking  the  committee  through  the  “significant  provisions”  of  each of
the  bill’s  sections.    The  first  section,  Title  I,  offered  the  essential  and  general  definitions  of  the  
bill,  while  also  offering  “several  broad  administrative  provisions.”    Of  these  provisions,  Hobby  
outlined three that the department regarded as crucial. The first would establish a National
Advisory Council on Health Service Prepayment Plans to be made up of 12 members from the
health insurance field. This council would provide technical expertise to the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The second major provision stipulated the necessary qualifications for
health insurance companies to receive reinsurance, while recognizing the authority of state
agencies to regulate health insurance carriers. The third strictly forbade federal regulation of any
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carrier,  hospital,  or  provider  of  medical  services.    This  section  reiterated  the  bill’s  recognition  of  
state regulation over health insurance.93
Title  II,  “Studies  and  Advisory  and   Informational Services,”  authorized  the  secretary of
HEW   to   “conduct   studies and collect information concerning the organizational, actuarial,
operational,   and   other   problems   of   health   service   prepayment   plans   and   their   carriers.”      This  
information would be made public and available to any insurance carriers, who could also
receive further technical advice. Title II intended primarily to provide a greater, and more
current understanding of the state of American health insurance. In addition, it offered a basis
for the creation of premium rates in areas where carriers had no experience. In summation,
Hobby   told   the   committee   that   titles   I   and   II   offered   a   framework   for   a   “cooperative   effort   by  
Federal,  State,  and  local  agencies,  public  and  private”  in  order  to  ensure  “the  broadest  possible  
approach will be made to the problem.”94
Hobby then turned her attention to Title III, the heart of the   reinsurance   bill.      “In   its  
simplest terms, Mr. Chairman, this Title would establish a reinsurance fund…to encourage and
stimulate insurance carriers to broaden benefits and areas of service.”   Hobby detailed how
insurance companies would be defined as eligible carries to receive support from the fund.
Under   the   bill,   a   “carrier”   could   be   an   insurance   company,   nonprofit   association   such   as   Blue  
Cross or Blue Shield, or a cooperative or partnership that offered prepayment protection for
health service. In short, this encompassed “all  groups  in  the  voluntary  heath  insurance  field.”95
With regard to the approval of individual plans that would apply for reinsurance, Hobby
reemphasized   the   “wholly   voluntary”   nature   the   program.      This meant that plans would be
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reinsured only if carriers chose to apply to the fund. The types and kinds of plans that would
qualify  for  the  “general  purposes”  of  the  program  would be governed by the primary objectives
of experimentation  and  extension  of  prepayment  plans.    This  would  include  coverage  for  “classes  
of   individuals”   where   insurance   coverage   was   “feasible,   but   [was]   not   adequate,” geographic
regions where   such   protection   was   not   “adequately   available.”      Finally, plans that would offer
coverage for issues “as  to  type,  range,  amount,  or  duration”  that  were not adequately available.
The section also included specific limitations. Plans with excessive “deductible   amounts   and  
maximum   liability   amounts”   and   plans   that   might   include   “undue exclusions or limitations”
would be excluded. Hobby emphasized that in these cases, the bill did not sanction federal
regulative authority over premium rates. “These  requirements,”  she  stressed, “would apply only
to a carrier which voluntarily agree[d] to  them  as  a  part  of  reinsurance  contract.”96
The bill did not set rates for the premiums charged to participating insurance carriers.
Hobby stated that reinsurance premiums would be set at differing rates for the various health
insurance plans to be reinsured. These would vary based on how well the plans reflected the
“actuarial   principles”   of   the   program.      Essentially,   rates would reflect the extent of the
company’s  willingness to enter into areas of risk. Once a plan was approved, the carrier would
be issued a reinsurance contract only covering specific qualifying plans, not the entire carrier.
The   federal   government’s   actuarial   liability   under   the   contract   was   subject   to   two   principles.    
First, the fund would reinsure only against  abnormal  losses  under  a  “particular  reinsured  plan.”    
Second, carriers would share the burden of these abnormal losses. The fund would meet 75
percent, with the individual organization assuming the remaining losses. Collected premiums
would make up most of the reinsurance fund. In order to set up the fund initially, the bill
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authorized  the  appropriation  of  “$25  million  to  a  capital-advance  account  in  the  Treasury.”    As  
the   government’s   funding   would   be   limited   to   this   initial   advance   of   capital   and not an openended authorization of funds, Hobby stressed that the program did not constitute a federal
subsidy.97
Despite the many advantages of the bill might offer, Hobby acknowledged three
limitations that were inherent in such a plan.

First, as the fund was designed to support

Americans through private insurance coverage, it would benefit only those individuals who
either chose to pay for insurance or who received it from their employers. Second, Hobby
warned that  the  program  “may  not  immediately  solve some of the problems of coverage for those
who  are  now  aged  or  of  those  who  already  are  chronically  ill.” Finally, Hobby explained that the
plan’s   success   relied   on   the   carriers’   willingness   to   make   use   of   reinsurance   as   well   as   their  
assumption  of  “new  and  broader  risks.”
Hobby   closed   by   stating   the   administration’s   general   expectations   for   the   plan.      She  
argued   that   combining   the   “stimulus   of   reinsurance   protection”   with   the   “incentives   of   free  
competition”   would   increase   the   extent   of   health   insurance   coverage   as   well   as   the   benefits  
provided.      “We   are   persuaded   that   the   bill   before   you   can,   in   the   traditional   American   way   of  
individual responsibility and private endeavor, do much in providing the means by which better
health  protection  may  be  attained  by  a  large  segment  of  our  population.”
The floor was then opened to questions from the committee members. Responding to
Hobby’s   allusion to the use of technical advisors from the field of private health insurance,
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James Dolliver (R, IA) began by asking what the role of these advisors were. Hobby said that
after her department drafted the bill, it was sent to the advisory committee, which then spent six
days  attempting  to  “perfect”  it.    Dolliver  then  asked  if  it  was  “fair  to  say  that…they  are  in  accord  
with the provisions of the bill.”    Hobby  answered  by  stating  that  the  eight  members  all  agreed  
that   bill   was   the   “best   way   to   implement   the   President’s   reinsurance   proposal.”   Dolliver
continued by asking whether there were any existing private reinsurance companies in the field
of health insurance.

Acting as an expert for the administration and as member of the

department’s   advisory   committee, James Stuart answered that at the present time there were
not.98
Congressman John Beamer (R, IN) asked Hobby if any groups had referred to the plan as
“an   opening wedge for socialized medicine.”      “I   do   not   believe   anyone   has   referred   to   that,”  
Hobby  responded.    When  asked  by  Beamer  if  “all  of  the  medical  associations”  supported  the  bill,  
Hobby stated that despite two meetings with the American Medical Association, that
organization had not made its opinion known. Beamer observed that these groups would likely
testify in the hearings and relinquished the floor.99
Robert Hale (R, ME) asked the secretary how the administration expected the bill to
accelerate health coverage. Answering for Hobby, James Stuart reasoned that by assuming much
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of   a   carrier’s risk, the plan would encourage these organization to enter fields where actuarial
risk were not  well  known.    “But  this  reinsurance  fund,  or  whatever  it  is  called,”  asked  Hale, “is
never going have any direct relation to any individual or any group.”   Stuart conceded that it
would   not.      “Do   you   think,   for   example,”   continued   Hale, “that a man in a low-income group
would be more ready to select health-insurance programs if he knew that this reinsurance fund
existed.”    Stuart  stated  that  he  did  not  believe  that this would happen, but that insurance carriers
would  be  more  likely  to  “try  to  work  out  programs  that  would  cover  him  if  we  felt  we  were  not  
taking  the  total  risk.”    While  individuals  might  not  be  more  likely  to  choose  insurance  coverage  
due to reinsurance, Stuart contended that insurance companies would be more likely to extend
coverage if reinsurance existed.100
The final question of the day focused on whether reinsurance qualified as a subsidy.
Dwight Roger (D, FL) asked how, if the government was to provide financial support for private
losses, reinsurance would not be considered a government subsidy.

As the fund would

underwrite multiple plans in order to pool the risk, Stuart believed the success of some would
offset the costs of others. Federal expenses would be limited to the $25 million principal, thus
limiting the costs of the program to the confines of the fund’s   profits. Stuart added that the
initial principal was likely to be repaid if the   administration’s   actuarial calculations proved
correct. Congressman J. Arthur Younger (R, CA) added that he believed that any program that
required a premium charge for risk could not be called a subsidy.101
By the end of the first day of hearings, the administration had laid out the foundation of
reinsurance.

In addition to providing the system of reinsurance, the administration had

emphasized several key features of the bill. It had recognized state authority in the field of
100
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health insurance regulation, distinguished the plan from subsidies, and reiterated the voluntary
nature of reinsurance. At 12:30, the committee went into recess until the following day.
Thursday, March 25th, was set aside for the committee’s   questioning of the
administration’s  experts.    Members  of  the  committee  began by asking the experts to weigh in on
the idea of the fund as a subsidy. Roswell Perkins, another assistant secretary for HEW, offered
a more restrained response than Hobby. While he conceded that it could initially be seen as a
partial subsidy, the reinsurance program was by  no  means  an  “outright  subsidy.”    The ability of
the fund to become self-sustaining, Perkins added, prevented such an occurrence.102
The committee shifted the conversation and asked Perkins for examples of fields where
the administration expected to see an expansion of coverage. Perkins used tuberculosis and
mental illness as fields where expansion was greatly needed. Congressman John Bennett (R, MI)
asked   “Do   you   feel   that   in   cases   where   tuberculosis   and   similar   types   of   chronic   diseases   are  
presently excluded, that the adoption of this bill will be an incentive for those companies to
provide  such?”    Perkins  answered,  “Precisely;;  an  incentive.    We  do  not  want  to  go  any  further  
than   that.”      Bennett   asked   the   panel   why   existing   carriers   did not currently cover these areas.
James Stuart told the committee that as costs of coverage went up, so did the premiums. As
these premiums became too expensive, either the insured or the insurer found it to be no longer
in their best interests to continue the coverage.103
The discussion turned to the popular interest surrounding with the bill. Conservative
Republican Thomas Pelly (R, WA) stated that his own inquires had found a lack of interest in the
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plan, which he attributed to the result of a lack of understanding. While Perkins conceded this
point, Chairman Charles Wolverton (R, NJ) found that he knew of   “no   subject”   in   his   time   in  
Congress   “that   [had]   created   so   much   interest   as   this particular   legislation.”      The   chairman’s  
comment sparked a flurry of commentary from the committee.

Hale derisively asked if

Wolverton   meant   health   insurance   or   reinsurance   in   particular?      “I   am   talking   about   both,”  
Wolverton responded. Priest added that the majority of individual support for the bill that he had
witnessed came from a general misconception of the proposal. He found that most people
believed   that   they   would   receive   direct   support   from   the   government   “which,   of   course,   as   I  
understand  it,  is  not  true.”    In  order  to  illustrate  this  point,  he  furnished a letter of support from a
constituent that supported the bill so that he could eventually apply for support from the
reinsurance fund.

Before closing the matter, Wolverton, a classic mid-Atlantic liberal

Republican, added that the bulk of the mail he had received reflected the opposite. Instead, he
found  that  popular  comprehension  did  see  the  benefits  of  reinsurance  as  indirectly  providing  “a  
better   protection   than   the   policies   that   they”   currently   had.      “I   venture   to   say,”   he   concluded,
“that anybody  who  looks  at  this  mail  will  be  impressed  with  that  fact.”104
The remainder of the day was spent on the actuarial fine points of the plan. The
committee focused on questions such as what the reinsurance premiums would look like, how
the plan would define various classes of individuals and the risk involved in coverage, and how
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the plan would affect both profit and nonprofit plans alike. The hearings took a philosophical
turn  when  John  Bell  Williams  (D,  MS)  asked  Roswell  Perkins  whether  it  was  the  “proper role of
the   government”   to   “encourage   people   to   take out health-insurance policies.” While Perkins
acknowledged  that  such  encouragement  would  likely  be  an  “incidental  benefit,”  he  stated  that  the
bill  did  not  “tell  anyone  to  buy  anything.”    The  assistant secretary went further by stating that in
comparison to the Social Security System and old age and survivors benefits, the bill was by no
means as coercive. Williams continued to push the point by asking if the government should
“encourage   participation of the people in any particular private business.”      Perkins   responded,  
“We  think  that  anything  that  has  the  tendency  of  making  available  to  the  people  better  protection  
against expenditures for medical care so that they in turn can receive better medical care, is
something that promotes the welfare of the American people.”      Despite   Williams’   skepticism  
about the   bill’s   ability   to   improve   the   “general   welfare,”   he   closed   his   comments   by  
congratulating   the   administration   “for   bringing   in   the   what   is   very   obviously a voluntary
program.”105
On the following day, the committee heard the first testimony from an opponent of the
bill. Dr. Edwin J. Faulkner, president of Woodmen Central Life, Woodmen Accident, and
Woodmen Central Assurance Company from Lincoln, Nebraska, also spoke on behalf of the
United States Chamber of Commerce.

He began by   supporting   President   Eisenhower’s  

denunciation of socialized medicine in the pursuit of improved health for Americans. Faulkner
then proceeded to detail the success of insurance companies in that same quest. He spoke of
exponential growth in the number of American with health insurance since 1939 and the
establishment of major medical insurance. He argued that, as such success by private companies
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continued, it would “be but a short time until substantially all of the population enjoys the
protection.”    When  he  turned  to  the  proposed  reinsurance  program,   Faulkner   maintained that it
would not decrease the costs of insurance. Of greater concern to Dr. Faulkner was the incursion
of federal authority into an area of private enterprise. “Such   a   portion   of   the   of   the   health  
insurance   business   as   may   become   reinsured,”   Faulkner   contended,   “will   become   subject   to  
Federal regulation.106
During the course of questioning by the committee, Faulkner offered his opinion that if
the federal government offered reinsurance it “might  be  a  first  step”  towards  socialized  medicine.    
He argued that giving the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the power to determine
whether or not reinsurance would be offered to a given plan amounted to a federal regulation.
Even when Faulkner was asked if he would support the plan if it were to work as the
administration  hoped,  he  flatly  answered,  “No,  sir,  I  would be personally opposed to the federal
government  getting  into  this  picture.”    He  stated  that  his  opposition  was  based  on  “what  it  will  
lead  to.”107
After the committee heard Dr.   Faulkner’s   testimony, it committee opened the floor to
William McNary, chairman of   the   American   Hospital   Association’s   Council   on   Government  
Relations, as well as a spokesman for the Blue Cross. In his brief opening statement, McNary
stated that his organizations supported the bill. While the AHA and Blue Cross found that bill
offered the ability to extend coverage significantly to Americans without insurance, he stated that
they wished to continue to develop the plan to ensure its success. To this effect, he proposed a
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few amendments to the bill, such as requiring a committee be created to approve the decisions
made by the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare regarding regulation of the fund.108
Chairman Wolverton thanked McNary  for  coupling  his  criticisms  with  “suggestions  that  
are   of   a   constructive   character.”      The   committee’s questions for McNary focused primarily on
how reinsurance would effect organizations such as the Blue Cross. For example, McNary
discussed how reinsurance might tangibly change the coverage of mental illness. At that time,
he told the committee, Blue Cross covered patients for only 30 days of hospitalization, as
compared to 120 days for most other cases.

Since Blue   Cross   had   “comparatively   little  

experience”   in   the   area   of   long-term mental care, the risk outweighed potential returns. He
foresaw  “making  use  of  [reinsurance]  to  offer  a  plan  of  extended  medical  benefits…because  we  
wouldn’t  be  taking  a  chance  with  all  of  our  capital  that  we  would  otherwise  have  to  take.”109
By providing the foundations of reinsurance and answering the various concerns of the
committee, the hearings had started off well for the administration. On March 31, the proposal
experienced its first significant setback when Henry   Beers,   one   of   HEW’s   advisors   from   the  
private sector and a representative for the American Life Convention as well as the Life
Insurance Association of America, refused to support the bill. He began his statement by
outlining what he believed to be the strengths of the bill, especially with regard to its reliance on
voluntary   action   through   nongovernmental   agencies.      Beers   also   believed   that   the   plan’s  
strengths also lay in its acknowledgement of state authority, its availability to both profit and
nonprofit plans, and the tangible incentives for carriers to extend coverage.
Despite  his  confidence  that  he  did  not  “believe  that   you  can  get  a  much  better  bill  than  
this,”   the   insurance   executive   also   testified that   “since   the   plan   is   new   and   so   many   important  
108
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details are yet unknown and therefore many uncertainties remain unresolved, we are not in a
position   to   go   on   record   in   favor   of   the   bill   at   this   time.”      The   insurance   executive   went   even  
further  by  contemplating  whether  he  would  approve  the  bill   if  it  were  to   be  amended.    “A  bill  
incorporating standards, eligibility, premium   rates…would   result   in   inflexibility.”   Even if the
plan were to be amended as they might see fit, his organizations would not support it. 110
Throughout  the  debate  over  the  administration’s  plan, the opposition from the insurance
industry echoed similar laments. Opposition to federal interference with the private sector was
coupled  with   concern  over  a  “lack  of  planning.”     Even  though the insurance industry regarded
the bill as the least objectionable government option, it was already clear that most private
insurance interests would not support federal incursion into the field.
The administration had cause for hope following the setback with Beers.

Two

representatives from the American Federation of Labor testified the next day. One of these
representatives, Nelson H. Cruikshank, the director of Social Insurance Activities for the AFL,
had long advocated the direct government subsidization of voluntary insurance. While clearly
not a proposal for such a dramatic measure, the bill was certainly a step in that direction. If the
corporate interests as expressed by the insurance companies would not support the plan, then
surely the AFL, a historic foe of such interests, would not join their ranks.111
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Cruikshank’s   testimony   began   with   a   summary   of   the   needs   of   the   “working   people,”  
which he believed were representative of the general population.

These needs included:

preventive care, access to medical facilities and personnel, comprehensive protection, full family
coverage, ability to pay, and an improvement in the quality of medical care. Second, he listed
what his organization had found as general needs of most communities: care for the chronically
ill and elderly, expansion of local heath facilities, aid to medical education, and expansion of
health facilities.    He  found  the  “worthy  purposes”  of  the  bill  to  be  encouraging,  “However,  as  we  
analyze the proposed implementation of these very worthy objectives, we are deeply
disappointed.”    For  the  AFL,  the  bill’s  major  failing  was  the  impetus,  or  lack  thereof, it placed on
insurance  companies  to  provide  extended  coverage.    “The  principle  of  reinsurance  may  make  it  
possible for commercial companies to extend their limited type of protection to meet some of
these needs,”  he  said, “but we find nothing that effectively  encourages  them  to  do  so.”112
On April 5, the bill faced its most ardent adversary, the American Medical Association.
Despite its prior statement that it would not take a stand on the proposal until all of the details
were  made  known,  the  AMA’s  history  with  Truman’s  proposal  left  little  doubt  as  to  their  likely  
position.  The  testimony   of  Dr.   David   Allman,   chairman  of  the  AMA’s   Legislative  Committee,  
followed  this  expectation.    Dr.  Allman  began  by  stating  that  his  association  had  “serious  doubts”  
regarding the necessity and efficacy of reinsurance. He argued that voluntary insurance had
taken tremendous strides in expanding both the quantity and quality of its coverage. The
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trajectory of this coverage, according to Allman, offered a real promise that voluntary insurance,
free  from  government  intervention,  would  meet  the  “needs  and  demands  of  the  public.” 113
When asked by the committee’s   chair,   Charles   Wolverton, to address why the AMA
opposed the bill despite the failing of the current system to cover the medical needs of a large
portion of the nation, Allman cast his most derisive criticism of the bill. Not only did the
association believe that federal reinsurance would not accelerate the coverage of these
individuals, the AMA believed  it  would  become  “the  opening  wedge  to  something  which  might  
lead  much  further.”    Wolverton asked what was “the opening wedge”  that  Allman  believed “it  
might lead to.” “Eventually,”   Allman   replied, “what   is   called   socialized   medicine,”   which   he  
defined  as   “Government-controlled  medicine.”    He  continued  by  relating  its  potential  effect  on  
Blue  Shield.  “When  the  Government  controls  the  Blue  Shield,”  Allman  warned, “they will soon,
we  are  afraid,  control  the  doctors,  which  in  turn  would  work  to  the  detriment  of  the  patient.”    “I  
certainly  would  like  to  have  someone  show  me  the  path  by  which  that  would  happen,”  Chairman  
Wolverton  replied.    Allman  argued  that  it  was  “a  question  of  money.” “When  Federal  moneys  
become involved,”  he  admonished, “Federal  control  follows.”114
For several minutes Wolverton attempted to understand what Allman and the AMA
found in reinsurance that resembled socialized medicine. When Allman stated that he did not
believe local care of the indigent was socialized medicine, the chairman asked at what point
medicine  would  be  considered  “socialized.”    Finally  Allman  argued  that  it  was  when  the  federal  
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government became involved.

Wolverton attempted to dispute why federal involvement

signaled such a state more so than state or local involvement, but Allman refused to concede.115
Wolverton pushed him for any alternative ideas that the AMA had conceived. He stated
that   the   hearings   were   “an   effort   to   meet   [the   lack   of   health coverage] which is recognized to
exist…Does   the   AMA   have   any   substitute   bill   for   that   which   we   have   before   us?”      Before  
allowing Allman to answer, Wolverton   heatedly   added   that   “it   is   very   easy   to   criticize…what  
this committee would like to have are constructive criticisms upon the part of those who say the
bill  will  not  do.”    When  Allman  was  allowed  to  answer,  he  simply  stated,  “The  AMA  has  no  bill  
to  offer…we  do  not  think  you  need  this  bill  and  we  do  not  think  you  need  a  substitute  bill.”116
Wolverton pressed the issue by comparing the reinsurance of health insurance with the
existing federal reinsurance of bank deposits. He asked why, since such a principle has not led
to the socialization of the banking industry it would socialize health insurance. Allman refused
to answer on the basis that he did not consider himself an expert in the field of banking or
insurance. The testimony closed with a final statement on that topic by the chairman.    “Do  you  
have to be an insurance man or a banker or a businessman to determine whether the principle is
socialistic  or  not?    If  so,  it  has  not  been  harmful  to  the  country  in  my  opinion.”117
When the hearings heard more from organized labor, the bill drew opposition on a
different basis. In his testimony as a spokesman for the federated unions of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations,   Joseph   Childs   stated   that   the   administration’s   program   was   “too  
meager.”    While  he  commended  the  Eisenhower  administration  for  recognizing the problems of
American health care, Childs argued that the plan could neither offer the funding needed to
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provide comprehensive health coverage for Americans who already had insurance, nor could it
deliver such protection to those without it. He therefore stated,  “We  do  not  favor  passage  of  the  
reinsurance  bill  because  it  will  not  help  to  solve  the  Nation’s  health  problems.”118
Childs then took his appearance before the committee as an opportunity to support the
enactment of national health insurance.

He argued that national health insurance was not

socialized   medicine,   as   it   “would   not   increase   direct   provision   of   medical   services   by   the  
Government.”    Childs believed that medical opposition to such a system came from a financial
fear   that   individuals   “would   have   something   to   say   about   the   charges   of   the   doctors.” “We  
object,”   he   said, “to this bogeyman of socialized medicine which is used as a threat to scare
people  from  looking  at  actual  proposals.”119
The hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce provided
a full vetting  of  the  administration’s  answer  to  the  problem  health  coverage  in  the  United  States.    
While the hearings included several witnesses who testified in favor of the bill, critics
condemned reinsurance for containing either too much federal involvement or not enough.
Nevertheless, with  the  help  of  the  committee’s  Republican  majority,  along  with  limited  support  
from Democrats on the committee, voted to send the bill to the floor of the House of
Representatives where it would face its first vote in July 1954.120
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On May 5, 1954, two days before the hearings on H.R. 8356 concluded, the general
counsel for the Life Insurance Association of America, Eugene Thore, addressed the annual
meeting   of   the   Health   and   Accidental   Underwriters   Conference   in   New   Orleans.      Thore’s  
statement, titled “A  Washington  Viewpoint  on  Accident  and  Health  Insurance,”  argued  that  the  
recent reinsurance proposal from the Eisenhower administration  demonstrated  an  “a  early  sign  in  
this  country  of  a  trend  toward  some  form  of  Government  participation  in  meeting  this  problem.”  
Thore  stated  that  Congress  saw  the  problem  as  an  issue  of  the  “quality  and  quantity  of  medical  
care.”     He   also   noted that   the   government   was  responding  to  “mounting   public  criticism…that  
medical  and  hospital  service  [had]  priced  itself  out  of  the  market.”121
Thore  warned  the  conference  that  this  mounting  support  for  reform  was  “not  a  series  of  
unrelated incidents arising out  of  the  turmoil  of  Washington  politics,”  but  the  “early  stage  of  a  
long-range   social   development.”      He   therefore   contended   that   the   field of voluntary insurance
should  protect  itself  “in  a  realistic  and  constructive  way”  against  the  challenges that would come.
He cautioned the conference that any lobbying efforts with regards to the reinsurance plan should
be   done   cautiously   in   order   to   not   disrupt   their   goal   of   creating   “the   best   possible   relationship  
between  your  business  and  the  national  government.”   Therefore he proposed the conference not
follow a policy of “unswerving   opposition,”   but   instead   recognize   that   “adjustments   are  
necessary”   in   order   to   work   with   the   government   to   shape   the   legislation.      Thore   closed   by  
reasoning that operating in such a manner served   “the best interests of the public, insurance
policyholders   and   the   business”   in   the   long   term.      Thore   saw,   as   did   the   proponents   of  
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reinsurance, that reform was likely to come and it was in their best interests to attempt to shape
it.122
The president met with Republican congressional leaders on May 10, three days after the
hearings on H.R. 8356. Seeing the hearings as an indication of  the  insurance  industry’s  overall  
opposition to reinsurance,   Secretary   Hobby   proposed   a   meeting   between   “interested private
insurance  officials”  and  the  administration. The legislators supported the meeting.123
At the resulting weeklong conference, assistant secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Roswell Perkins, represented the administration. Perkins argued that
without  compulsory  health  insurance,  a  “vacuum”  had been created. He further reasoned that if
private insurance wanted to   head   off   compulsory   health   insurance,   it   “had   to   fill   the   vacuum”  
with a different option. Reinsurance, maintained Perkins, could do just that. That argument, and
the meetings, proved unpersuasive to the insurance officials.

Perkins contended that the

opposition’s   confidence   in   their   position   resulted from the defeat of national health insurance
during the Truman administration, coupled with the success of Republicans in recent elections.
“I  think  that  the  conservatives  felt  that  they  were  sitting  in  a  pretty  good  position  at  that  point,”  
Perkins later recalled, “and I think that they were terribly shortsighted.”    Conservatives  and  the  
insurance   industry   alike   “didn’t   face   the   fact   that   if there was no government activity, if there
wasn’t   a   sincere   national   effort   to   meet   the   problem,   that   they   were   going   to   get   compulsory  
health  insurance.”124
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In a final push to increase support for reinsurance before the vote in the House that July,
President Eisenhower invited seventeen presidents of various insurance companies to a White
House luncheon on May 17 to discuss the proposed bill. Toward the end of the luncheon,
President Eisenhower addressed the issue of reinsurance. Speaking informally, the president
began by stating that he believed the role of the federal government in matters   of   a   “social  
nature,”   was   to   “define   and   redefine   the   areas   which   must   remain   subject matter of private
endeavor   and   those   areas   in   which   government   had   a   legitimate   concern   and   responsibility.”    
Despite describing himself  as  a  “conservative  by  nature,”  Eisenhower  stated  that  given  the  health  
care problems of the nations, he believed “that the government had a responsibility to move
forward  in  a  limited  way.”    The  president maintained that reinsurance fit into this philosophy. It
would  not  attempt  to  regulate  their  industry,  but  instead  offered  “assistance  and  encouragement”  
to private insurance. 125
Perkins thought that the president “did  a  fine  job  of  striking  the  right  themes  and  the  most  
responsive chords so far  as  this  group  was  concerned.”    At  the  same  time,  he “unflinchingly and
forcefully   supported   the   bill.”      Following the luncheon, the executives released a statement
expressing general support for the proposal’s objectives, as well as an indication that they were
willing to work with the administration to try to improve it. Despite their optimistic tones,
Perkins and the administration did not believe that the meeting had resulted in any significant
changes in the minds of the seventeen executives.126
With less than two weeks before the House vote on H.R. 8356, the AMA began heavily
lobbying members of Congress. On July 2, Roswell Perkins sent a memorandum to Secretary
Hobby  entitled  “AMA  Attacks  on  Reinsurance  Bill.”    The  assistant  secretary  stated,  “the AMA
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has   opened  fire  on  the  bill   with   its  heavy   guns.”   Facing a   “White  House-AMA  fight,”  Perkins  
suggested the administration  have  a  final  meeting  with  the  bill’s  most  committed  opponent.127
Five days later, Perkins and three other members of HEW met with representatives of the
AMA including its president, Dr. Walter Martin. Martin began the meeting by asking why such
a bill was needed. After Perkins stated that the administration believed experimentation was
needed to increase both coverage and benefits to the millions who lacked it, Martin argued that
such experimentation existed. Martin feared “that this device could lead to Government subsidy
of   insurance   plans   that   were   unsound.”      The   AMA   officials   claimed   that they agreed with the
objectives of the bill and that they did not think it would interfere with individual medical
practices. While Martin did say that he opposed “comprehensive   care,”   the   AMA   president  
claimed its opposition was based solely on the opinion that it would not cover more people or
increase benefits. While the meeting closed with Martin agreeing to hear the opinions of
insurance executives who supported the plan, it was clear that the American Medical Association
had made their decision.128
When the day came for a final vote in the House, reinsurance faced an uphill battle.
While the administration could count as allies in health organizations such as the American
Hospital Association, Blue Cross, and many life insurance agencies, it faced an even larger array
of opposing forces. The American Medical Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and
many accident and health insurance companies added to the conservative Republican opposition,
which saw the bill as too much intervention by the federal government. From the other side,
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labor interests combined with liberal Democrats in searching for a plan that would offer a much
larger federal role in health coverage.129
On July 13, the House of Representatives opened the floor to Charles Wolverton (R, NJ),
chairman of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce. After Wolverton presented the
bill, he called for his colleagues to give favorable consideration to this   “middle-off-the-road
approach,”  which provided support for the millions of Americans who lacked protection from the
costs of illness and injury. Reinsurance, he stated, would work within the system of free
enterprise while assisting private insurance coverage in the expansion of coverage.      “The   bill  
deserves,”  he  concluded, “the hearty approval of all who believe in a better, stronger, and more
healthful  nation.”130
When the floor was opened to debate, Congressman John Bell Williams (D, MS) asked
Congressman J. Percy Priest (D, TN), who was a member of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign   Commerce,   “besides   the   President   and   Mrs.   Hobby,   does   the   gentleman   know   of  
anybody who is enthusiastically in favor of this bill.”    Priest  responded,  “We  had  some  witnesses  
before  the  committee  who  were,  I  think  perhaps,  enthusiastic  for  it,  but  not  a  great  number.”    The  
Democrat from Mississippi seemed to capture the lack of enthusiasm that surrounded the bill
aptly:   “The   fires   of   enthusiasm   which   have been developed, and which have been kindled in
favor  of  this  bill  would  probably  freeze  water,  would  they  not?”  Priest  responded   that he could
“go  along  with  at  least  part  of  the  way  toward  the  freezing  point.” Congressman Arthur Klein
(D, NY) added to  Williams’  concern  by  listing  the  parties  he  saw  as  for  and  against  the  bill.    He
recorded the primary opponent as the American Medical Association. “Who  else  is  against  this  
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bill? Well the insurance companies that will have to administer it are almost all   against   it.”    
Klein argued that only the administration and the leaders of the Republican Party were  “hot”  for  
it.    “They  want  a  campaign  issue,” he charged.131
Despite the best efforts of Wolverton, J. Percy Priest, and the other early supporters of the
bill, the negative feedback continued to build. Congressman John Dingell (D, MI) argued that
instead of receiving a bill that had been well thought out and capable of addressing the problems
facing   Americans,   the   administration   had   offered   a   “puny   and   totally   inadequate   ‘gimmick’  
which all expert testimony at the hearings has demonstrated can accomplish virtually nothing.
That  is  why  this  is  a  fraud  on  the  American  people.”132
Once the bill had been heard and commented on, Williams moved to have the bill
committed back to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

The House of

Representatives voted 238 to 134 in support of recommitment. The 238 votes in favor of
sending the H.R. 8356 back to committee included 75 Republicans (33% of Republicans in the
House), 162 Democrats (76% of Democrats in the House), and one independent. The only
doctors in the House, all four of whom were Republicans, voted to recommit. Members of the
committee from whence the bill originated (17 Republican and 14 Democrat), largely voted their
party’s line. Fifteen voted in support the bill, and 12 opposed it. The New York Times aptly
summed up the failure by stating that   it   “seemed   that   the   bill   simply   had   been   caught   in   a  
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crossfire by the conservative wings of both parties from one direction and by New Deal and Fair
Deal  Democrats  from  the  other.”133
When Dwight Eisenhower returned from the funeral of Helen Elsie Eisenhower, the wife
of his brother Milton, he learned that the Republican-held House of Representatives had
overwhelmingly rejected his health reinsurance program. Eisenhower demanded a thorough
breakdown of the roll call, including the names of the Republicans who voted against the bill.
“If   any   of   those   fellows   who   voted   against   that   bill   expect   me   to   do   anything   for them in this
campaign, they are going to be very much surprised. This was a major part of our liberal
program   and   anyone   who   voted   against   it   will   not   have   one   iota   of   support   from   me.”
Eisenhower’s  anger  and  exasperation  over  the  failure  of  this  bill  had only begun.134
The next morning, July 14, the president met with Republican congressional leaders to
discover the reasons for the bill’s defeat. House Majority Leader Charles Halleck said that the
views of Democrats, private insurance companies, and the American Medical Association had
been reflected in the vote. The president   responded   with   the   following:   “I   don’t   believe   the  
people of the United States are going to stand for being deprived of the opportunity to get
medical  insurance.    If  they  don’t  get a bill like this, they will go for socialized medicine sooner
or later.”135
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That  same  day,  President  Eisenhower  met  with  the  press  to  discuss  the  failure.    “I’m  sure  
that   the   people   who   voted   against   this   bill   just   don’t   understand   what   are   all   the   facts of
American  life.     I  don’t   consider  that  anyone  lost   yesterday   except   the  American  people.”    The  
president reasoned  that  the  bill’s  opponents  had  chosen  to  look away from those  “not  getting  the  
kind  of  medical  care  to  which  they  are  entitled.”    He  continued by stating that he did not believe
“that  there  is  any  use  in  shutting  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  American  people  are  going  to  get  
that  medical  care  in  some  form  or  another.”   When asked to respond to claims that the plan was
the  result  of  his  party’s attempt to make good on campaign promises, Eisenhower shot back, “of,
course  I  am  trying  to  redeem  my  campaign  promises,  and  I  will  never  cease  trying.” 136
Privately, Eisenhower could not understand why the plan was voted down or why the
AMA did not support it. While meeting with his legislative leaders,  he  stated,  “Americans  want  
health coverage. But doctors won’t  give  an  inch.”    As  far  as politicians should be concerned, he
asked,  “what are people going to say when a man running for office is asked-what did you do
about health-and  had  to  answer  nothing.”137
The condemnation of his bill from historically opposed sides  fit  in  with  the  “middle  road”  
did not dissuade Eisenhower from believing in the validity of the plan. The president apparently
“felt   pretty   good”   when   he   was   criticized   from   both   sides   of   an   issue,   as   “it   makes   me   more  
certain  I’m  on  the  right  track.”    Nonetheless, this philosophy did little to suppress the president’s  
anger over the failure of his bill. This anger was first directed at the Republicans who had voted
against him and he pledged not to them support in the coming congressional elections. By the
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next day, his anger transformed to exasperation. After House Majority Leader Charles Halleck
added private insurance companies and the AMA to the list of entities who had thwarted the bill,
Eisenhower could not seem to comprehend their actions. “How   in   the   hell,”   he   asked, “is the
American Medical Association going to stop socialized medicine if they oppose such bills as
this.” 138
This moment demonstrated Eisenhower  as  a  “classic  Tory  reformer.”    The  president  who  
sought   to   expand   the   structures   of   government   and   who   “made   the   New   Deal   consensus  
genuinely  bipartisan”  had  done  so  in  part to prevent further radicalization. Reinsurance fit that
pattern. As the president saw it, the only way to prevent the threat of socialized of medicine
from taking over American health care (which he, along with the AMA, opposed), was to have
the federal government meet the American people in the middle and reform the current system in
a manner similar to reinsurance. In short, Eisenhower believed limited federal reform could
prevent radical federal reform.139
Despite  the  president’s  hopes,  reinsurance  had  failed.    Eisenhower  pressed  a  vote  for  the  
bill’s   passage   for   another   year,   but   it   never   even   made   it   to   the   floor   of   the   House.      The  
administration had identified one of the major problems of American health care and offered a
solution that they believed would satisfy both free enterprise and social welfare. Instead of
receiving   support   from   either   side   of   the   spectrum,   the   “middle   way”   instead   received  
condemnation from both. The factionalism of American health care and ideology had proven
itself an inhospitable environment for compromise. Instead it created entrenchment.140
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Chapter Five:
“The  Camel’s  Nose  in  Their  Tent:”  Evaluating  the  Failure  of  Reinsurance
When Roswell Perkins looked back on the fight over reinsurance, he noted the logic
behind   private   opposition.   “The   insurance   groups   didn’t   really   want   any   intervention   in   their  
business…they  didn’t  want—the  camel’s  nose  in  their  tent.”    The  American  Medical  Association  
and most insurance companies did not find significant problems with the specifics of the
proposal. Rather, they saw reinsurance as representing a growth in federal intervention, the
greatest  threat  of  the  plan.    Their  “simplistic  and  doctrinaire  position”  led  them  to  fear  that  “the  
next people   would   use   it…to   have   compulsory   health   insurance.”      The   AMA   led   the  
conservative opposition to the bill, but it was not the only side of the ideological spectrum that
resisted such reform. Perkins noted the anti-reinsurance alliance on the right was bolstered by
the   “extreme   left   who   did   not   want   anything   to   distract   from   the   cause   of   compulsory   health  
insurance  which  they  were  dedicated  to.”141
Perkins’s   progression   through   the   list   of   supporters   and   opponents   made   it   clear   that  
reinsurance did not have the support to come back from its defeat in the House. This did not stop
Dwight Eisenhower from pursuing the plan. Believing that socialized medicine was inevitable if
Americans were not provided with a better option, Eisenhower stated, “I  am  going to continue to
speak  my  piece  on  this  and  continue  to  fight  for  it  as  long  as  I  am  in  office.” While his fight for
reinsurance continued into the next session of Congress, the plan was effectively dead.142

141

Reminiscences of Roswell Burchard Perkins (April 2 and July 11, 1966), on page 42 in the
Columbia Oral History Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the
City of New York; Press Release, James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, May 17,
1954, Reinsurance, Box 17, Papers of Oveta Culp Hobby, DDEL.
142
Diary Entry, July 14, 1954, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, 90.
89

American conceptions of health care at the beginning of the post-war era created an
exceptionally inhospitable environment for federal intervention in any form. While a significant
minority continued to support a large-scale federal option, it proved inadequate to produce such a
change. The burgeoning medical lobby took the lead on private opposition to wide-ranging
government health care. From this point on, health insurance for the majority of the American
population came increasingly from employers.

Subsequent government options, such as

Medicare and Medicaid, targeted segments of the population, specifically the elderly and those
receiving public assistance, not the entire population. The reinsurance proposal, and its defeat,
effectively illustrated this very trend in its early stages.143

Shortly after the House moved to recommit the reinsurance bill, various private
organizations began to reach out to the American Medical Association in an effort to reconcile
the increasing divide between the health industry and the Eisenhower administration. Quoting
the  president’s  belief  that  “some  health  measure  ought  to  be  adopted  by  this  Congress,”  the  new  
executive secretary of the New Hampshire Medical Society, Hamilton Putnam, asked the AMA
to   renew   discussions   with   the   White   House.      “Because   of   our   own   efforts, those of us in the
medical   field   are   now   riding   high,” noted Putnam.

At the same time, he expressed his

trepidation   over   potentially   earning   the   disapproval   of   an   administration   that   was   “pledged   to  
support   the   free   enterprise   system.”      Most   significant to Putnam was the negative effect that
professional  medicine’s  opposition  might  have  in  terms  of  public  relations.    He  closed  his  letter  
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to   the   director   of   the   AMA’s   Washington   office,   Frank   Wilson,   by   urging   the   organization   to  
“mollify   its   relationship”   with   the   administration   and   find   some   middle   ground   based   on   the  
concept of reinsurance.144
On the same day, the president of Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Frazar
Wilde,   sent   a   letter   to   the   AMA’s   president,   Dr.   Walter   Martin.      Unlike   Putnam, Wilde was
disappointed in the House vote and expressed concern over the power the Democratic Party had
displayed  in  the  defeat  of  reinsurance.    “The  vote  confirms  my  worst  fears;;  namely,  that  there  is  
a strong probability that the Democratic Party, if it gets into power, will insist on an elaborate
Governmental   Health   Program.”      While   Democrats   had   proven   invaluable   to   the   aims   of   the  
AMA  in  this  case,  Wilde  believed  that  the  medical  sector’s  refusal to take modest steps toward
reform would ultimately lead   to   a   much   larger   federal   incursion   than   reinsurance.      “Then,”   he  
warned, “we really will have socialized medicine in a large way, even though it will probably be
called  by  some  other  semantic  term  that  will  sound  nice  to  the  public  at  large.”145
Despite the concerns of other leaders in the health field, the AMA refused to change its
position.    Martin’s  only   contact   with   the   administration  immediately   following  the  House  vote  
was a two-sentence thank you note to Eisenhower and White House Chief of Staff Sherman
Adams. Martin thanked the administration for allowing him and his organization to be part of
the   discussion   on   “the   problem   of   federal   reinsurance”   and   stated   his   “admiration   [for]   and  
confidence”  in  the  president.    The  following  week,  Dr.  Martin wrote an editorial on reinsurance
for his hometown paper, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.      He   argued   that   reinsurance   carried   “no  
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magic   touch”   to   increasing   the   speed   with which Americans would receive health insurance.
Despite his testimony in the spring committee hearings that his lack of expertise in the area
precluded him from speaking on the actuarial provisions of reinsurance, his editorial argued that
the   proposed   bill’s   premiums   could   not   possibly   decrease   costs   while   remaining   “realistic   in  
terms   of   the   actuarial   risk   involved.”      Beyond   the   plan   itself,   Martin   stated   in   his   closing   that  
once   the   federal   government   entered   into   the   area   of   health   insurance   “there   is   a   real  
danger…that   its   activities   would   extend   further.”      While   the   AMA   had   stated its support for
Eisenhower, it was clearly not going to support his plan.146
A   week   after   the   bill’s   defeat,   Dwight   Eisenhower   wrote   to   the   chairman   of   the   House  
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Charles Wolverton. Eisenhower expressed his
deep  belief  in  the  administration’s  health  objectives.    “Our  people  are  demanding  – and are going
to get – good   health   and   medical   services   at   prices   which   they   can   afford.”      The   president  
thanked the congressman and his committee for their dedication to finding a solution to the issue,
and  their  work  on  the  bill’s  behalf.    He  closed  by  stating  that  reinsurance  remained  a  major  goal  
of the administration. When Eisenhower spoke to the nation on August 23rd regarding the
accomplishments of the 83rd Congress, he stated that reinsurance would be put in front of
Congress once again. In a speech at the Hollywood Bowl in Los Angeles a month later, the
president stated his legislative proposals to  the  next  Congress  would  “include legislation to meet
the needs of our people in the field of health and medical care--and it will once and for all
repudiate the philosophy of socialized medicine.”      When,   in   November,   the   Department   of  
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Health, Education, and Welfare presented its legislative proposals for the next year, reinsurance
was at the top of the list.147
In the next few months, the Eisenhower Administration began its second push for
reinsurance. On October 9, the Washington Insurance Newsletter ran an article from Oveta Culp
Hobby  titled  “Health  Reinsurance.”    The  article  began  with  Hobby’s  analysis  of  the  defeat  of  the  
reinsurance bill. The opposition, she noted, came from those who opposed any federal action as
well as those who sought compulsory health insurance. Hobby addressed a third party that she
suspected to have   contributed   the   bill’s   defeat:   “those   who   simply   did   not   understand   the   bill  
fully.”      Continuing   with   the   belief   that   a   lack   of   understanding   played   a   major   role,   her  
department   planned   to   “redouble”   their   efforts   to   make   the   proposal’s   “intent   and   its content
tangible  and  clear.”148
Hobby addressed the primary concerns of those who feared federal intervention and those
who wanted more. Regarding the fear that reinsurance would intrude on the regulatory powers
of the state over the insurance industry, she argued that states would have to approve any
reinsured plan, thus leaving state power intact. Since the bill specifically limited federal funding
for reinsurance to its initial appropriations, Hobby argued that the fear of extended federal
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support was unfounded.      She   also   refuted   the   concern   that   reinsurance   would   be   a   “waste   of  
public funds.”   “Improvident or unsound companies,” she argued, would not use and therefore
would not deplete the fund. Hobby   stated   the   proposal   was   made   as   a   “frankly   experimental
measure.”    While  she  acknowledged  the possibility that the plan might not work, she argued that
the   administration   believed   that   “experimentation   [was]   precisely   what   [was]   needed   in   the  
health  insurance  field.”    Hobby  did   not,   however,   directly tackle the objection that reinsurance
served as an opening for socialized medicine, possibly the largest concern of private industry.
Instead, she closed by emphasizing the solution for insuring millions of Americans must come
from cooperation between the public and private sectors and any legislative steps taken to
address   such   an   issue   had   to   be   “firmly   established   within   a   framework   of   free   enterprise   and  
private  initiative.”149
A   week   later,   as   a   part   of   Hobby’s   plan   to   increase   understanding   of   reinsurance, she
traveled to Chicago to speak at the American Life Insurance Convention. Following the speech,
J.C. Higdon of American Life Insurance sent Hobby a letter thanking her for appearing and
expressing his  organization’s  appreciation  of  “an Administration that encourages the handling of
insurance  by  private  industry  rather  than  government.” Higdon believed that a large portion of
individuals  in  the  health  insurance  industry  had  “been  unable  to  visualize  many  situations  where  
the proposed health reinsurance plan would be applicable,”   and thought that   Hobby’s  
presentation clarified some misconceptions. However, his understanding that temporary loss
covered  by  the  reinsurance  fund  “must  later  be  repaid  by  the  insurance  company”  demonstrated  
that he himself misunderstood the plan.150
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Hobby’s   public   campaign   for   reinsurance   peaked   when   she   spoke   to   the   American  
Medical  Association’s  House  of  Delegates  on  November  29.    She  took  the  opportunity  to  address  
the   AMA’s   driving   concern   regarding   reinsurance:   that   it   provided a potential opening for
socialized  medicine.    She  began  by  laying  out  the  administration’s  two  overriding  objections  to  
the  socialization  of  medicine.    First,  “such  a  proposal  would  not,  in  fact,  achieve  the  objective  of  
better health for more of the American   people.”      Second,   it   would   be   too   costly.      The
administration did not regard socialized medicine as an option, she said, but the status quo was
unviable. Using the previous six years as an example, Hobby argued that the gap between
medical costs and medical coverage would continue to grow. The inability of either compulsory
health insurance or the status quo to offer effective solutions, Hobby stated, provided the impetus
for the  administration’s  reinsurance  proposal.151
Not only did the administration believe that reinsurance could help voluntary health
insurance   close   the   “gaps   in   coverage   and   benefits,”   it   believed   that   such   an   approach   was  
“clearly  consistent  with  the  principle  of  self-help.”    The  program,  Hobby  stated, was consistent
with  high  medical  standards,  would  preserve  a  patient’s  free  choice  of  doctors,  and  would  leave  
the doctor-patient relationship unchanged. Furthermore, it offered the ability for more people to
receive health insurance and provided insurance carriers the ability to offer better coverage.
The  pooling  of  insurance  risk  through  reinsurance  “has  been  widely  used  in  the  insurance  
industry – in,  for  example,  life,  marine,  and  casualty  insurance.”    Hobby  argued  that  the  principle  
of reinsurance married  caution  and  necessity  together  and  would  allow  encouragement  of  “selfhelp  without  subsidy.”    She  continued  by  demonstrating  that  this  idea  had  already  led  insurance  
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companies to extend coverage to some catastrophic illnesses and longer-term hospitalization.
“Insurance   experience   over   the   years,   however,   has   demonstrated   that   what   at   one   time   was  
considered  an  uninsurable  risk  at  a  later  date  had  become  recognized  as  insurable.”    Reinsurance,  
she contended, would only speed this up for insurance organizations that lack actuarial
experience in varying fields.
Hobby returned to the fear of socialized medicine as she concluded her speech. Her
recent work with the AMA, Hobby stated, had demonstrated that Americans favored voluntary,
private plans as a  route  to  ensuring  their  family’s  security;;  yet  they  required  a  tangible  solution.    
“We  need  insurance  against  compulsory  health  insurance,”  she  said,  “and  we  firmly  believe  that  
the reinsurance proposal – if enacted – provides  that  kind  of  insurance.”152
On December 6, assistant secretary for HEW, M. Allen Pond sent a memorandum to
Nelson   Rockefeller,   on   the   “events   of   the   last   two   months   relative   to   reinsurance.” Pond had
spent several months meeting with groups such as the Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the AMA,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers in order to gauge
their levels of support for reinsurance.

The meetings revealed particular concern for how

reinsurance would affect major medical insurance and rural coverage in addition to a general
anxiety   over   the   program’s   qualification   standards.      However,   the   array   of   concerns   from   the  
organizations varied widely.
With regard to major medical coverage, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and the National
Association of Manufacturers did not want plans offering only major medical coverage to be
offered support from the reinsurance fund.

Yet, the National Association of Insurance

Commissioners wanted even more support for such plans. While Pond found more cohesion of
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opinion regarding rural coverage, it remained a divisive issue.

Pond found a   “unanimous  

opinion”   that   the   problem   of   extending   rural   coverage   was   not   one   of   risk-taking, but a
“merchandising  problem,”  an  issue  of  “formation  and  maintenance  of  groups  where  cash  income  
is neither   steady   nor   high   and   population   is   dispersed.”      Yet,   the   groups   divided   on   how to
address the problem. The department also found “a  wide  divergence  of  opinion”  regarding the
inclusion of standards. Labor and voluntary nonprofit insurance organizations favored standards,
while commercial insurance did not. An increase of the federally provided principal from $25
million to $100 million addressed the concern that the  fund  was  not  large  enough  to  “accomplish
its  stated  objectives.”153
Assistant Secretary  Pond’s  summary  also  included  his  evaluation  for  the  overall support
for the proposed fund: “Discussions  with  numerous  persons  representing  various  points  of  view  
have   not   indicated   any   substantial   enthusiastic   support   for   the   proposal.”      Pond   addressed the
position of six major groups.

Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and other nonprofit insurance

organizations   “were   likely   to   support   a   reinsurance   bill   in   1955.”      The   insurance   industry,  
according to Pond, was split. Although private life insurance companies largely supported the
bill,  

private   accident   and   health   insurance   companies  

displayed   “considerable  

opposition…primarily  in  the  mid-west.”    The  American  Medical  Association,  U.S.  Chamber  of  
Commerce, and the National Association of Manufactures continued to believe that such a plan
was   unnecessary.      While   Pond   found   that   state   insurance   commissioners   had   been   “somewhat  
mollified,”  he  also  saw no sign they would actively support the plan. Labor would not support
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the  plan.    Farm  groups  “recognized  the  need  for  some  action”  but  were  also  unlikely  to  support  
the plan enthusiastically.154
When the cabinet met on December 10, 1954, Hobby and Perkins presented the
reinsurance   proposal.      While   the   presentation   included   “certain   revisions   to   make   it   more  
tangible   and   thus   easier   to   understand,”   it   remained largely the same as the plan from 1954.
When Hobby and Perkins made the same presentation to Republican congressional leaders on
December 13, discussion focused more on the  AMA’s  opposition  than on the plan itself. Though
she said she did not know if the  AMA’s  stand  had  change  since  the  bill’s  defeat  in  July,  Hobby  
believed  she  had  seen  “some  softening”  by  the  association’s  president  and  president-elect at their
meeting in November. Charles Halleck (R, IN), the House majority leader, who had also
attended that same meeting, did not agree that such a change had taken place. The legislators
seemed to be perplexed by the AMA’s position. Senator Eugene Milliken (R, CO) said that he
“couldn’t   see   where   doctors   would   be   interfered   with   in   the   conduct   of   their business by
reinsurance.”    Hobby  and  her  team  all  agreed  that  doctors  would  not  be,  and  they consequently
could not understand why doctors would then oppose reinsurance.

The administration

understood that the AMA opposed reinsurance, but why and for how long they would oppose it
continued  to  confound  the  plan’s  proponents.155
In his third State of the Union Address on January 6, 1955, Eisenhower covered the state
of the Cold War and the fight against communism, the continued growth of the American
economy, and further proposals for the national highway system. Once the speech turned to the
154
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state of American health, Eisenhower stated that his administration would again pursue
reinsurance. When the president presented the revised plan in a special message to Congress, he
stated that “many of our fellow Americans cannot afford to pay the costs of medical care when it
is  needed,  and  they  are  not  protected  by  adequate  health  insurance.”    Consequently, the president
recommended “the   establishment   of   a   Federal health reinsurance service to encourage private
health insurance organizations in offering broader benefits to insured individuals and families
and   coverage   to   more   people.”      However,   this   request   used   a   new   three-pronged approach to
refocus the bill towards those whom the administration found most in need: “1.  Health  insurance  
plans providing protection against the high costs of severe or prolonged illness, 2. Health
insurance plans providing coverage for individuals and families in predominantly rural areas, 3.
Health insurance plans designed primarily for coverage of individuals and families of average or
lower income against medical care costs in the home and physician's office as well as in the
hospital.”   Despite this second attempt, the bill never made it out of committee.156

One year later, on January 26, 1956, The New York Times ran an editorial titled,   “The  
Right  to  Good  Health.”   Written  in  response  to  President  Eisenhower’s  “Special  Message  to  the  
Congress   on   the   Nation's   Health   Program”   a day earlier, the editorial concluded that
Eisenhower’s   new   “five-point   plan”   was   departure   from   the   administration’s   position   over   the  
past two years. The new plan focused on medical research, teaching facilities, health personnel,
and   an   increase   in   “basic   health   services.”      The   plan’s   fifth   point   called   for   the   expansion   of  
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voluntary health insurance to allow more people to meet the costs of health care. Eisenhower
directed this call towards the insurance industry, which he believed should join together to the
pool the risks of health coverage.

The speech mentioned reinsurance only briefly. “The  

important role of the Federal Government,” Eisenhower continued, “is to provide assistance
without interference in personal, local   or   State   responsibilities” yet the piece found that the
“tenor”  of  the  president’s  message  was  not  about  the  role  of  government.    Instead,  it  was  “as  it  
should be, not an argument about responsibility, but a restatement of the right of the individual to
the  medical  care  he  needs.”   The editorial stated that since the defeat of reinsurance, the president
had  been  temporarily  “persuaded”  that  private  insurance  had  the  ability  to   address   the   costs  of  
health care and would extend coverage to those who lacked it. However, Eisenhower specified
that  if  these  measures  proved  inadequate,  that  he  would  “again  urge  enactment  of  the  proposal  
made  last  year.”157
The New York Times piece argued that while this offered a reprieve for private health
insurance, of “which  they  should  take  advantage,”  the health of American families should not be
subjected  to  “the  principles  of  the  market  place.”    If  insurance, or potentially reinsurance, did not
provide an answer   for   the   65   million   lacking   health   insurance,   “then   the   government   will   step  
in.”    Yet,  the  editorial acknowledged that the  problem  of  “ill  health  in  a  humane and democratic
society”   proved to be a complex one. The issue continually got caught between differing
interests  and  mores.    “The  simple  fact,”  contended The New York Times,  “is that our knowledge
has  expanded  far  more  rapidly  than  our  ability  under  existing  circumstances  to  use  it.”    The  piece  
did  not  argue  that  the  best  care  could  possibly  be  made  available  to  all,  but  that  “we  could  come  
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nearer  to  it.”    In  order  for  this  happen,  the editorial contended, either “we  must  have  prepaid  and  
Federally guaranteed group insurance,”   or   public   enterprise   would need to take over.
Reinsurance had failed, and private insurance had won. The Eisenhower administration now
charged free enterprise with solving one of the most pressing issues of social welfare in the
United States. The new question for the Eisenhower administration became how to create
change in the health field without scaring off the AMA, AHA, insurance companies, Democrats,
or labor unions.158
Even before the debate over reinsurance, Eisenhower sponsored the Revenue Act of
1954, which would prove to be one of the most influential acts of his presidency relating to
health. The Act of 1954 was an extension of the existing Revenue Act of 1943, which had
precluded the taxing of employer health insurance during World War II.

The version

Eisenhower supported formalized the law as a permanent portion of the tax code and extended its
scope exempting both employer and employee-paid health insurance premiums.

The plan

received strong support from the AMA, AHA, and labor unions. It easily passed through
Congress and became law.159
Just as the failure of reinsurance had done, the Revenue Act of 1954 further placed health
insurance into the domain of the employer and private industry as a whole. This did not signify
the gradual removal of the federal government from the issue. Instead, the American social
welfare system only became further entangled between the public and private sphere. While a
plan  as  comprehensive  as  Truman’s  call  for  national  health  insurance  would  never  take  hold  in  
the United States, the federal government became a cornerstone of American health insurance.
The tax break formalized in 1954 exists today and costs the federal government more than $200
158
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billion annually. Medicare and Medicaid, social insurance systems established in 1965, created
what   would   become   one   of   the   federal   government’s   largest   social   expenditures.      In 2013,
spending on Medicare and Medicaid combined reached just over $1 trillion dollars, or 35 percent
of total national heath expenditures.    Overall,  the  federal  government’s  26 percent of the share of
the $2.9 trillion total health expenditures in 2013 is second only to the costs sponsored by
households (28 percent). Private business (21 percent) and state and local governments (17
percent) make up the other major expenditures.160
This deepening of the public-private welfare relationship took a substantial step in the
direction of federal intervention with the creation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on March
23, 2010. As  did  Eisenhower’s reinsurance plan, the ACA intended to increase the availability
of insurance, especially for those unable to pay the costs of medical coverage.

Unlike

reinsurance,   “Obamacare”   sought to reach this goal by extending federal oversight through
compulsory elements, including penalties for refusing to participate in health insurance. As of
May 2014, 20 million people had gained insurance under the ACA. While this figure does not
account for individuals who may have already been insured, the percentage of Americans
without insurance has dropped 5 percent in the last year alone.161
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Nearly 60 million Americans lacked health insurance in the 1950s. Existing proposals
saw   the   solution   as   either   more   government   regulation,   such   as   Harry   Truman’s   plan,   or   less  
regulation in order to allow private industry to solve the problem. Dwight Eisenhower’s  style  of  
Tory reform saw the solution lying in the middle. An avowed fiscal conservative, he refused to
allow the federal government to become the sole operator and financier of health insurance. Not
only did Eisenhower fear the financial implications of socialized medicine, he believed it to be a
substandard system of medical care. However, Eisenhower understood that reform was not only
necessary for the health of the nation, but also demanded by its citizens. Just as the nineteenth
century British reformer, Benjamin Disraeli had done, Eisenhower moved to expand earlier
liberal initiatives as a part of his belief to act liberally “in all  things  which  deal  with  people.”    In  
this way, the president could offer reform as a means of heading off a more radical option.
Reinsurance encapsulated this strategy of Tory reform.162
Just as reinsurance effectively demonstrated Dwight Eisenhower’s   “middle   way,”   it  
illustrated the foundations of modern American health insurance within the evolving conceptions
regarding the role of the federal government.

At the same time that post-war Americans

increasingly accepted federal involvement as a part of their everyday lives, they participated
more and more in private health insurance. When reinsurance was introduced as a federal
program meant to increase the use of private plans, it would not command enough support to
become law.      Eisenhower’s   Tory   reform   had   failed.      Increasing   health   coverage   in   the   United  
States was further delegated to private industry.
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